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GO WORLD

Autumn 1992 NO.68

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
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The Cover: Wakakusa at the Go Board.

An album leaf by Harunobu, published in 1770, from *A Collection of Beauties of the Brothels of the Yoshiwara*, vol. 1, sheet 10a. In this famous album the artist depicted well-known courtesans of the day, each with a short poem presumably in her own handwriting. Shown here is one whose name is given as Wakakusa of the House of Manjiya in the famous

pleasure quarter of Edo. The seventeen syllable poem above her is a tissue of double-meanings and allusions:

*Again they break (she parts her thighs),
the fancy sandals she wears —
cherry-blossom salt.*

(Continued on page 7)

Go World News

International News

2nd Ing Cup: Triumph for World's Top Woman Player

The Ing Cup, or more precisely, the Ing Chang-Ki Cup: The World Professional Go Championship, is the world's richest go tournament, with a first prize of \$400,000 and a second prize of \$100,000. Sponsored by the Taiwanese Industrialist Ing Chang-Ki, it is held every four years, in the year of the Olympics.

The opening rounds of the 2nd Cup were held in Tokyo in July. This year the tournament was marred by disputes over the selection of competitors but was redeemed by a superb performance by the world's top woman player. Before discussing the tournament further, let's look at the results so far.

Round 1 (13 July). Yoo 5-dan (Seoul) defeated Perng 5-dan (Taipei), Awaji Shuzo (Tokyo) d. O Rissei (Taipei), O Meien (Taipei) d. Ishii Kunio (Osaka), Seo Bong-soo (Seoul) d. Tei Meiko (Taipei), Chan Ka Yui (Hong Kong) d. Hashimoto Shoji (Osaka), Yoda Norimoto (Tokyo) d. Wu Songsheng (Sydney), Yang Jae-ho 8-dan (Seoul) d. Michael Redmond 7-dan (Santa Barbara), Rui Naiwei 9-dan (Shanghai), d. Komatsu Hideki (Tokyo).

Round 2 (15 July). Cho Chikun (Seoul) d. Yoo, Awaji d. Cho Hun-hyun (Seoul), Takemiya (Tokyo) d. O Meien, Seo d. Fujisawa Shuko (Tokyo), Otake (Tokyo) d. Chan, Rin Kaiho (Taipei) d. Yoda, Yang d. Jiang Zhujiu (Taiwan), Rui d. Lee Chang-ho (Seoul).

Round 3 (17 July). Cho d. Awaji, Seo d. Takemiya, Otake d. Rin, Rui d. Yang.

The semifinal pairings (best-of-three) are Cho v. Seo and Otake v. Rui.

The most notable results in the first three rounds were probably the failure of the 1st Cup winner Cho Hun-hyun and the success of Rui Naiwei, the world's only woman 9-dan. Reaching the semifinals of a world championship is the most remarkable performance ever

by a woman player, not only in go but probably in any board game. Rui's performance is all the more remarkable for her lack of competitive experience in the last couple of years (she has been living in Japan).

The strange feature of the 2nd Ing Cup is the absence of Japan's number one, Kobayashi Koichi, and the absence of the top Chinese players. The former is explained by a new rule adopted by Ing for this tournament, the latter by a serious dispute with political ramifications.

Ing Chang-Ki founded this tournament for the express purpose of propagating his system of rules, the SST rules, in the hope that eventually they might become the world rules of go. Special features include the counting system (see *The Go Player's Almanac*) and a komi of 7 1/2 points (in Japanese terms). While no top professional, to our knowledge, approves of these rules, they have been accepted as the price of participating in the tournament. This year, however, Ing introduced another rule that seemed to some to distort the nature of the game: buying extra time for komi. After his time allowance of three and a half hours has expired, a player automatically gets an extension of 35 minutes, for which he has to pay two points komi. Three time extensions are possible, after which the player loses on time. In theory, if Black is the player getting the extensions, the komi could swell to 13 1/2 points. That's the komi Otake ended up receiving in his game against Chan. Ing justifies this system in simple terms: 'Time is money.' Kobayashi Koichi, however, found it unacceptable and declined his invitation to play.

The boycott of the tournament by mainland Chinese players was more serious. Ing himself explained the situation as follows: There were three major differences of opinion between the Chinese Weiqi Association and Ing. The tournament is organized privately, by the Ing Chang-Ki Educational Foundation, so it has the right to invite whomever it pleases. However, the Chinese Weiqi Association proposed three conditions.

The first concerned the selection of players. The Chinese objected to the inclusion of Rui

Naiwei. The Japanese and Koreans approved of her playing, however, and eventually the Chinese gave way and accepted her.

Secondly, the Chinese wanted to hold the first three rounds in Shanghai, with their Association acting as joint sponsor. This was not acceptable to Ing.

The third condition was related to the second: there were reasons why Jiang Zhujiu could not come to Shanghai, so his participation was not acceptable to the Chinese.

Ing stressed the fact that he was inviting the participants personally (Jiang, by the way was seeded from the 1st Cup) and not as members of national teams (which is why they are representing cities). Since neither side would compromise on the second and third conditions, China decided not to participate.

The question then is why the participation of Rui and Jiang was not welcomed by China. The Chinese never gave any reasons for objecting to these two, but it may be noted that both left China shortly after the Tiananmen Massacre of June 1989 (Rui for Japan and Jiang for California). There are rumours that both of them participated in the democratization movement and that Jiang in particular played an active role.

It's a great pity that this dispute arose to mar the tournament. It's ironic that Jiang, whose participation was the real sticking point, disappeared after one game while Rui reached the semifinals.

A footnote: At the reception for the Cup, Jiang and Rui, who were enjoying their first reunion for a couple of years, announced that they had got married, though after the tournament Jiang returned to California and Rui stayed in Japan.

In our next issue, we will present some of Rui's games.

Otake Wins 5th Fujitsu Cup

Otake Hideo has won his first international tournament, though by the narrowest possible margin. After defeating Nie Weiping in the quarterfinal and Ma Xiaochun in the semifinal, Otake was matched against another Chinese player, but a Taiwanese member of the Nihon Ki-in, in O Rissei. O had also had to fight his way past two top Chinese players to win his way to the final. Beginning with a win over

Seo Bong-soo, one of Korea's top three, he defeated Che Zewu, the dark horse of the tournament, who had eliminated Lee Chang-ho of Korea and Kobayashi Koichi, and Liu Xiaoguang.

The final was played in Tokyo on 1 August. Otake started out well, but tenacious play by O upset his lead. However, Otake finally succeeded in edging him out by half a point.

Liu defeated Ma to take third place.

Nie Wins Japan-China Tengen Playoff

After eight losses in a row in Meijin and Tengen title playoffs between Japan and China, Nie Weiping has finally turned the tide. By defeating Rin Kaiho 2-0 in the 5th Tengen Playoff, he has scored China's first victory.

The games were played in Tokyo on 20 and 22 June. Nie won the first by 2 1/2 points and the second by resignation.



Another international success for Takemiya

TV Asian Championship: Four in a Row for Takemiya

Takemiya's extraordinary run of success in the TV Asian Championship, a playoff among the TV champions of Japan, China and Korea, continues. There may only be a small number of players in this tournament, but even so four successive wins in a knockout tournament is perhaps a unique record.

The participants in this tournament are the top two place-getters in Japan's NHK Cup, China's CCTV Cup, and Korea's KBS King of

Go Championship, plus the previous winner if he is not one of the above. It is four years since Takemiya won the NHK Cup, but he has remained a seed since then. Full results follow.

Round 1. Ma Xiaochun (China) beat Seo Bong-soo (Korea), Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) b. Cho Chikun (Japan), O Rissei (Japan) b. Nie Weiping (China).

Round 2. Takemiya b. Ma, Cho b. O.

Final. Takemiya beat Cho by half a point.

In Japan the games were telecast on cable TV from 31 August to 5 September.

Japan Leads in 7th Super Go

Spurred on by its success in scoring only its second victory in the 6th Japan-China Super Go series, Japan has got off to good start in the 7th series and has taken a 4-1 lead. Komatsu Hideki 8-dan made up for his past failure in the Super Go by defeating Liu 4-dan and Wu 7-dan, both by 3 1/2 points, before losing to Zheng 7-dan. Yoda Norimoto 8-dan then matched Komatsu's performance by defeating Zheng and Zhang Wendong 8-dan. His next opponent is Yu Bin 9-dan.

The other remaining players on the Chinese team are Ma and Nie, while Japan still has Kobayashi Satoru, Yamashiro, Kataoka, Awaji, and Otake.

4th Tongyang Securities Cup

The 4th Tongyang Securities Cup, a Korean-sponsored international tournament, has progressed as far as the quarterfinals. Pairings are:

Rin Kaiho (Ch. Taipei) v. Nie Weiping (China), Cho Chikun (Korea) v. Kim Soo-jang 8-dan (Korea), Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) v. Ma Xiaochun (China), Lee Chang-ho (Korea, last year's winner) v. Yoo Chang-hyeok (Korea).

Reflecting the local sponsorship, ten of the 24 participants were Korean, and the host country is having a good tournament. All five Japanese representatives have been eliminated, although two Nihon Ki-in players remain. Below are some results of interest from the first two rounds, which were staged at the Seoul Hilton.

Round 1 (27 July). Kim Soo-jang (Korea) beat Jimmy Cha (USA), Kang Hoon 7-dan (Korea) b. Victor Bogdanov (Europe).

Round 2 (29 July). Rin b. Seo Bong-soo (Korea), Nie b. Yoda, Kim b. Takemiya (Japan), Yoo b. Kato (Japan).

This year the prize for first place has been doubled to 100 million won or around \$100,000, which just tops the first prize in the Fujitsu Cup.

Kikuchi Wins 14th WAGC

Kikuchi Yasuro of Japan has achieved a long-cherished ambition by winning the 14th World Amateur Go Championship, held at Makuhari Messe in Chiba City from 27 to 30 May. Three players ended up with 7-1 scores, but Kikuchi had a superior SOS. Kikuchi had led throughout the tournament, but the issue was complicated when he lost to Han of China by half a point in the 7th round. However, a final-round win over Laurent Heiser of Luxembourg made sure of victory. The latter had his best tournament to date, taking 4th place with 6-2. Also scoring six wins was Matthew Macfadyen (UK), who came 5th.

News from Japan

Cho Defends Honinbo Title in Yet Another 'Miraculous' Upset

After making a terrible start to his title defence in the 47th Honinbo title match with three straight losses, Cho Chikun turned the tables on the challenger, Kobayashi Koichi, with four straight wins. In the past recovering from a 0-3 deficit used to be termed a 'miraculous' fightback, but Cho has now done it in the Kisei and Honinbo titles, and had it done to him in the Meijin title, so perhaps it's time to retire the epithet.

Kobayashi Koichi must be wondering if he is ever going to win the Honinbo title. He has challenged Cho Chikun four times, taken the early lead in the title match each time, and yet has always ended up losing. Last year also (this was the third year in a row he has challenged Cho) he lost four games in a row after winning the first two.

Cho has now held the Honinbo title for four years in a row and six overall, thus matching Takemiya's record. No matter how poorly (by his standards) Cho is doing in other tournaments, Kobayashi always seems to bring

out the best in him. One more defence and he will qualify for the title of Honorary Honinbo, so far earned only by Takagawa, Sakata, and Ishida.

The results:

Game 1 (15, 16 May). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 2 (27, 28 May). Kobayashi (W) by resig.

Game 3 (9, 10 June). Kobayashi (B) by resig.

Game 4 (17, 18 June). Cho (B) by 8 1/2 points.

Game 5 (25, 26 June). Cho (W) by resig.

Game 6 (8, 9 July). Cho (B) by 3 1/2 points.

Game 7 (22, 23 July). Cho (B) by 7 1/2 points.

48th Honinbo League

After 12 years out in the cold, Ishida Yoshio, Honorary Honinbo, is making a comeback in the 48th Honinbo league. However, in the only game so far played in the new league, he got off to a bad start by losing to Chan Ka Yui. The other vacant places were taken by Yamashiro, Rin Kaiho, and Kataoka.

Kobayashi Defends 17th Gosei Title

If Kobayashi has been showing great persistence in becoming the Honinbo challenger three years in a row, in the Gosei title he was faced with a challenger demonstrating equal persistence. Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan first challenged Kobayashi in the 15th Gosei title in 1990. He didn't win a game, but in a return match last year he pushed Kobayashi to the limit before losing 2-3. This year, after beating Cho Chikun in the playoff, he looked set to give Kobayashi another hard time, but as it turned out he was only able to take one game off the title holder. With this victory, Kobayashi added the title of Honorary Gosei to his laurels.

Only once before has a player challenged for a title three years in a row (Otake v. Cho Meijin from 1982 to 1984), yet here we have it happening in successive title matches. What will be interesting will be to see if either of the Kobayashis can set a unique record next year.

The results:

Game 1 (1 July). KK (B) won by resig.

Game 2 (16 July). KK (W) won by 1 1/2 points.

Game 3 (29 July). KS (W) won by 4 1/2 points.

Game 4 (26 August). KK (W) won by resig.

Kobayashi Challenges Shuko for Oza Title

Kobayashi Koichi defeated Yoda Norimoto 8-dan in the final to decide the challenger for the 40th Oza title, so he is now engaged in his first ever title match with Fujisawa Shuko. The first game, played on 8 October, was won by Kobayashi.

Tengen Challenger: Kobayashi or Yamashiro? Will Kobayashi Set a New Record?

Kobayashi Koichi will meet Yamashiro Hiroshi in the final to decide the challenger for the 18th Tengen title. If Kobayashi wins he will set a new record: playing in all the title matches of the seven open titles in one year. This was a feat that proved to be beyond even the legendary Sakata, who in the year of his greatest dominance (1964) missed out on just the Judan title match.

With all this success, Kobayashi is having perhaps his busiest year ever. It's not surprising he can't find time for international titles like the Ing Cup and the Tongyang Securities Cup.

Kobayashi Leads Otake in 17th Meijin Title

Otake Hideo is making his fifth attempt to regain his favourite title, the Meijin, which he last won in 1979. Most recently he lost 2-4 to Kobayashi in 1990, but now he is having another crack. All told, this is the tenth Meijin title match he has played in.

Otake led from the start of this year's Meijin league, but he stumbled in the sixth round, losing to Rin, which let his closest pursuer, Yoda 8-dan, draw level with him on 5-1. However, in the next round (played on 2 July) Otake secured the sole lead again by defeating Yoda.

The final round was held on 6 August. Otake beat Yoda's friend and rival Komatsu Hideki and Yoda lost to Cho, so Otake clinched first place two points clear of the field. Otake also played an important role in enabling his old friend and rival Rin Kaiho to hang on to his place, first by losing to him himself, then by stopping Komatsu from scoring higher.

In the title match, Kobayashi, playing for his fifth Meijin title in a row and the consequent degree of Honorary Meijin, has taken a

17th Meijin League Title-holder: Kobayashi Koichi

Rank	Player	R	T	C	Y	F	O	I	A	K	Score	Place
1	Rin Kaiho	—	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	3 — 5	6
2	Takemiya	1	—	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	4 — 4	5
3	Cho Chikun	1	1	—	1	0	0	1	0	1	5 — 3	2
4	Yoda	1	0	0	—	1	0	1	1	1	5 — 3	3
5	Fujisawa S.	0	0	1	0	—	0	0	1	0	2 — 6	—
6	Otake	0	1	1	1	1	—	1	1	1	7 — 1	1
7	Iwata T.	0	1	0	0	1	0	—	0	0	2 — 6	—
7	Awaji	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	—	1	5 — 3	4
7	Komatsu H.	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	—	3 — 5	—

Note: Players are ranked according to results in the previous league.

2-1 lead, but the challenger showed such good form in the game he won (apart from slacking off in the endgame and letting the game get close) that he won't be counting his chickens yet.

Results to date:

Game 1 (9, 10 August). Kobayashi (B) by resig.

Game 2 (24, 25 August). Otake (B) by 1/2 point.

Game 3 (30 Sept., 1 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) by 1 1/2 points.

17th Kisei Tournament

With the final stage of the 17th tournament almost completed, Kato Masao seems to have the best chance of becoming the challenger. He has already won his way through to the best-of-three playoff, where his opponent will be either Tono Hiroaki 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in or Komatsu Hideki 8-dan.

The early star of the second stage of the tournament was Ryu Shikun 5-dan, who won four games in a row in the irregular knockout known as the *paramasu* (we are still waiting for a reader to enlighten us on the etymology of this word). That took him into the standard knockout tournament that is the second part of the second stage. Results there follow:

Round 1. Takemiya b. Fujisawa Shuko, Kato b. Cho Chikun, Ryu b. Rin Kaiho, O Rissei b. Ishii Kunio, Komatsu b. Yamashiro, Yoda b. Ishida Yoshio, Ohira b. Otake, Tono b. Miyazawa Goro.

Round 2. Kato b. Takemiya, O b. Ryu, Komatsu b. Yoda, Tono b. Ohira.

Semifinal 1. Kato b. O.

Most noteworthy perhaps is the failure yet again of Cho Chikun to become the challenger. Every time he is faced with a Kobayashi challenge for the Honinbo title, he comments that it's about time he returned the courtesy by challenging Kobayashi for one of his big titles. It seems fated not to be the Kisei, however, for he has now missed his eighth chance since losing it to Kobayashi.

If Kato does become the challenger, he will be having his fourth crack at the title and his third against Kobayashi Kisei.

Redmond Unsuccessful in First Title Match

Michael Redmond 7-dan has made his first appearance in a title match, but unfortunately was unable to prevail against a tough opponent. Michael won his way to the best-of-three playoff in the 17th Shinjin-O (king of the new stars) title with wins over such prominent young players as Mimura Tomoyasu 6-dan, who has played in the Meijin league, and Yuki Satoshi 7-dan, the top young player at the Kansai Ki-in. His success as the first Westerner to contest a title final earned him a mention in the morning TV news on the day of the first game, but he was outplayed by Komatsu Hideki 8-dan, a member of both leagues this year who is also doing well in the Kisei tournament, as noted above. Komatsu forced him to resign in the first game, played on 21 September, and won the second, played on 1 October, by 4 1/2 points. *Continued on page 48.*

The Cover

(Continued from page 1)

'Fancy sandals' signifies a prostitute; 'cherry-blossom' alludes to a handsome lover; 'salt' suggests a house in the pleasure quarters because of the ancient custom of putting little piles of it beside the entrance of such establishments to ward off evil influences — a custom faithfully observed in parts of Japan even today.

A courtesan who hoped to attract wealthy patrons had to be more than physically attractive. She was also expected to be skilled in at least some of such graces as calligraphy, poetry, singing, samisen-playing, or games. In this print Wakakusa is shown holding the white stones, meaning perhaps that she was known as a strong go player.

Errata

On page 21 of *GoWorld* #67, the wrong figure was inserted for Figure 9. We apologize to our readers for that mistake, and give the correct figure below.





Figure 9 (264-368)



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The 29th Judan Title

In GW65 we gave the second game from the 1991 title match and promised to try to fit in other games in the next issue. Well, we didn't make it, and as we write this the 1992 Judan title match is already well under way. Late though it is, we would still like to give the other games from the title match, as they were among the most interesting games of last year. In particular, we think Game 3 takes the prize for the most spectacular cut-and-thrust affray for quite some time. Takemiya's go has an image of grandeur, thanks to his majestic moyos, but it's interesting to see that he will also engage in all-in wrestling.

In this article we present brief commentaries on the first, fourth and fifth games and a more detailed one on the third.

Game One

White: Takemiya Masaki Judan

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Played in Taipei on 14 March 1991.

Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)


Figure 1 (1-50)

The game gets off to an interesting start, with the players ignoring each other's moves whenever they can.


Black 21 is too close to White's thickness and also gives White an excellent extension to

22. Black A-White B-Black C would be more usual, but of course Cho knows that. As in Games 1 and 2 in the Honinbo title match (see GW66), there is a masochistic element in his play in this game — he's deliberately letting Takemiya play his favourite centre game. Takemiya probably felt good when he attacked with 26 and 32.

Professionals can't always be trusted: Cho makes a simple mistake in the top left corner. Instead of Black 47, the joseki is 1 in *Dia. 1*; after the moves to 7, White 'a' won't be sente. When Black crawls first with 47 and 49 in the figure, playing 51 in Figure 2 at 1 in *Dia. 2* is risky, as Black may attack the whole group with 2 and 4.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100)

Black 51. If at 54, White will attach at 53.

After 57, White 88 is sente, as White threatens to play a ko with A, Black 89, White B. That is why *Dia. 1* is the joseki.

White is clearly ahead after Black's slip. He is also satisfied with the result of his attack on the bottom black group: Black is more or less groveling up to 73.

White 90. White has an excellent position, but he should force with White 91, Black C, White D, Black E before playing 90.




Figure 3 (101-150)
30: at 10

Figure 3 (101-150)

White 8 is a brilliant move. If Black answers at 15, White crosscuts at 9 and has to capture something (please confirm this for yourself). Up to 14, Black keeps the damage down as much as possible, but still this is a big gain for White.

However, even better than playing the above sequence might be to attack the centre group with a placement at 27. The subsequent fighting would be difficult, but White would have a good chance of killing the group. Of course, White prefers to win without trying to kill Black as there is no knowing what will happen during Black's struggle for life.

Since he is behind, Black chooses to destroy centre territory with 17 rather than living with 27 immediately.

White 20 shows that Takemiya thinks he can win without killing White, but once Black plays 17, reducing White's centre, White should attack with the placement at 27 instead of 20. The chances are he could kill Black.

When Black makes his two eyes with 27, he

seems to have upset White's lead, but Takemiya's play after this shows that he still believes he's ahead.




Figure 4 (151-200)
95: connects




Figure 5 (201-275)
28: connects at 15; 74: connects at 17
75: connects right of 41

Figures 4, 5

Takemiya lost this game not because of any bad moves but because the opening was too good for him. When Black asked to be killed with 17 in Figure 3 he declined the invitation. His over-optimistic positional judgement can be blamed for his loss.

Black wins by 2 1/2 points.
(Kido, May 1991)



Takemiya seems to be wondering where he went wrong. This game was co-sponsored by the Ing Chang-ki Foundation and was played on the special go table designed by Ing.

Game Three

The following game was undoubtedly one of the most aggressive ones played last year. It's very difficult even by professional standards, but we hope that even if not interested in the analysis the reader will enjoy the game for its entertainment value.

The commentary takes the form of a round-table discussion among Otake Hideo, Haruyama Isamu (who gave a public commentary during the game) and Kobayashi Satoru (who gave a TV commentary).

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Cho Chikun

Played in Morioka City on 4 April 1991.

Figure 1 (1-16)

Otake: This was a really incredible game.

Igo Club (Hotta Gobanshi): I've never seen the 9-11 combination in a game between high-ranked players.

Kobayashi: In joseki books they give the pattern in *Dia. 1* as a counter to the trick move.

Haruyama: There's a ladder involved. In this game the ladder — Black A after 14, White

B, Black C — doesn't work. Black would get thickness if he could capture the two stones. In a book by Abe (Yoshiteru 9-dan), he gives the extension of 1 in *Dia. 2* for 12.




Figure 1 (1-16)


Kobayashi: The players were saying that the continuation from 2 gives White a good result.

Otake: Can't Black descend at 2 in *Dia. 3*?


Kobayashi: White will play 3 and 5, then 7 because he doesn't want to be squeezed. Black 8 follows.

Otake: The kind of player who rams into White and cuts (9 and 11 in the figure) probably has no intention of playing as in Dia. 2.


Haruyama: Black A doesn't get a ladder, so Chikun descends at 15.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Figure 2 (16-42)

Figure 2 (16-42)

Haruyama: White 16 was dubious. Takemiya later commented that he should have followed Dia. 4, sacrificing the corner stones. Locally this loses points, but in the whole-board context it's reasonable, he says. 'This is more like the real me' was how he put

it.


Otake: It keeps things simple. It's straightforward.

Kobayashi: Takemiya doesn't like getting into messy fights at the beginning of the game.

Haruyama: White 18 may be a new move.


Otake: If White plays 18 at 21, Black presses at 23; if then White A, Black 25, White 24, Black 36, followed by pushing up at White 26 and cutting, the liberties get filled in, which feels bad.

Playing 19 and connecting at 21 feels frightening — White presses at 22. I could never play like this. Why doesn't Black press at 1 in Dia. 5?



Dia. 5


8: connects




Dia. 6

Kobayashi: If White 2, Black squeezes with 3 on, then jumps to 9.

Otake: Right. This looks good for Black. Another thing — answering 24 at 25, letting White play 26 etc. — doesn't this make Black feel bad?



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Kobayashi: Black could have extended at 1 in Dia. 6. Takemiya agreed that the moves to 9 would have followed. He said it's reasonable for White if he captures a stone, as there's still some *aji* in the corner. Instead of 26, the outside hane of 1 in Dia. 7 is probably the usual move. After 2 to 6, White can play the triple hane of 7 and 9 that Haruyama Sensei was recommending. If Black 'a', he loses seven

stones after White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', so Black 1 to 7 in *Dia. 8* can be expected. How does White reinforce on the outside is the question.

Otake: If you were actually playing, you'd make the diagonal connection of 8.


Kobayashi: Both players were of the opinion that this was reasonable for White.

Otake: If White 'a', Black 'b' — the corner group is dead as it stands, so Black has gone all-out on both the right side and at the bottom. However, giving Black this degree of profit won't make White angry.

Haruyama: It's better for Black to crawl at 29 immediately without exchanging 27 for 28. Also, apparently Takemiya overlooked the nose attachment of 33. If White plays 34 at 1' in *Dia. 9*, it's all over after Black 2 and 4 — 'a' and the ladder after 'b' are *miai*.


Otake: What if White plays 1 and 3 in *Dia. 10* instead of 42?

Haruyama: That's how he should have played. It's painful for Black to have to add another stone at 'a', yet if he omits it, White has the brilliancy of 5 in *Dia. 11*, giving White an approach-move ko.



Dia. 9

Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Figure 3 (42-63)

Otake: White 42 was careless — White had to play in the centre. Takemiya tried to make Cho play extra moves to capture the corner white group, but Cho outsmarted him, sacrificing his seven stones on the side and forcing

him to capture them.

Kobayashi: The centre white group is running short of liberties after 44.

Haruyama: White spent one hour ten minutes thinking about 48. White has no choice but to fill in a black liberty like this. If he jumps to 1 in *Dia. 12*, he is captured by White 2 and 4. After 10, he can't move out with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'. If 1 were at 'e' (48), he can atari Black above 'c'. Next —






Figure 3 (42-63)



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

5: connects

Dia. 13. If he tries to move out with 1, it's all over after Black 6.


Kobayashi: Instead of 48, he should have captured the seven stones by making a hane at 1 in *Dia. 14*, but the result is not quite satisfactory when his other group is captured with 2 and 4.

Otake: Black is also left with sente moves like 'a' and 'b'. Black is left with strength in


various places, so it's no good for White. In trying to make a forcing move, White on the contrary fell victim to one.

Haruyama: Next, Black's placement on the second line at 53 is a fantastic move. We had also discovered this move in the pressroom, but playing 49 and 51 on the outside before 53 is perfect timing — the only timing.


Kobayashi: First, if Black uses 49 to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 15*, White escapes with 4, which is no good. Black is behind in the fight on the side.




Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16



Dia. 17


Next, even if White resists 53 with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 16*, he is captured after Black 2 to 8. If next Black 'a' through White 'd', Black finds he can't get out any further; if instead he plays 'a' at 'b', he again finds himself trapped (as in *Dia. 13*).

Haruyama: You have to admire the precision and depth of Cho's reading when White cut at 52. If Black changes the timing, playing 1 in *Dia. 17* first, White has the clamp tesuji of 6, so Black is in trouble. If he continues by playing 1 in *Dia. 18*, White slips out on the side and in the centre with 2 to 10. Yet if Black switches 3 to 1 in *Dia. 19*, he loses his centre stones after 2 and 4.


Otake: This blow struck home in an instant. Moving out with 54 at 61 is not possible. Having a move like this played against you would make you panic.

Kobayashi: It'd certainly rock you. In the end, White reluctantly has to exchange 56 for 57. When his bottom group is captured with 57 and 63, the gap in territory taken by the two sides disappears.

Otake: Perhaps Black has profited to the extent that his moyo centred on the top right corner enclosure has become sure territory. The game is essentially over.



Dia. 18



Dia. 19




Figure 4 (64-100)

Figures 4, 5, 6

Haruyama: The game was an incredible contest in reading, on top of which it progressed very slowly, so Kobayashi and I were put on the spot at our public commentaries. The local fight was everything, so we couldn't say anything about the overall position.

Otake: Looking at this game and at Cho's games in the Fujitsu Cup, the impression I get is that at the moment Cho is not worrying too much about winning or losing.

the game: there's no need for him to do anything.

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Igo Club, June 1991)

Game Four

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played on 18 April 1991.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

After his loss in the hectic melée that was the third game, Takemiya was faced with a *kadoban*. The good thing about Takemiya is that he doesn't play safe when in trouble: this game became an excellent demonstration of the 'cosmic style' at work.




Figure 5 (101-200)

55: connects (above 37); 86: at 81




Figure 6 (201-223)

Cho is searching for something. He thinks about all kinds of good variations and bad variations, and he is seeking something in the variations he thinks are bad. He is deliberately driving himself into a corner. He's seeking something on the very edge. So you can't say he's in his best form now. . . . Once he overcomes this, he'll be a greater player. Even as it is, his games rise above the ordinary.

Igo Club: Black plays solidly for the rest of




Figure 1 (1-33)

Figure 1 (1-33). A difficult fight to start the game

Cho goes along with Takemiya in playing on the star-points, so we get 'kyuren-sei' or 'nine successive star-points'. Instead of the popular 'outside' approach below 20, Takemiya plays on the inside at 17.

Black 25 is a good move: it injects strength into the moyo. The game gets complicated when White peeps at 26. If Black connects at A, White will attack at 28; note that Black is reluctant to play B, because he is aiming at invading the corner.

Black 27 seems unlike Takemiya — one

would expect him to push up at 32. If White answers 27 at C, Black can connect at A and be satisfied with 27 as a forcing move, but of course Cho is not so docile.

If White answers 33 by cutting at A, Black probably intends to connect at D.





Figure 2 (34-58)



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (34-58). *White misses his chance.*
Black 35. If at 36, White gets a ladder.
Black 39 is the vital point.

White goes for profit with 40 on, but letting Black connect at 51 is dubious, as it makes him very strong in the centre. The conclusion of the players after the game was that White should have used 44 to cut at 1 in *Dia. 1*. Even after 10, Black will have to add another stone to defend against White 'a', so White will be able to invade the right side before Black plays 53 and 55 in the figure. Takemiya said he would have played Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', but even so White could be satisfied.




Figure 3 (59-104)

84: ko; 85: connects (at 72); ko: 87, 90, 93, 98,
101; 103: connects the ko

Figure 3 (59-104). *Not enough ko threats*

In the fight on the right, White 78 is a good move. Black doesn't have time to connect at A. Unfortunately for White, however, he doesn't have enough ko threats, so he has to content himself with successive moves at 102 and 104. Winning the ko ensures Black of victory.




Figure 4 (105-215)

38: ko (right of 35); 41: ko

Figure 4 (105-215). *One missed chance*

There is no need to comment on the rest of the game. White lost because he missed the chance to follow *Dia. 1*.

White resigns after Black 215.

(Kido, June 1991)

Game Five

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 25 April 1991.

The first four games of this match were all won by Black, but getting White in the *nigiri* probably didn't worry someone of Takemiya's self-confidence. In any case, as Otake pointed out a couple of years ago, Takemiya's real artistry lies in his play with White.





Figure 1 (1-42)
30: connects (at 15)

Figure 1 (1-42). A familiar fuseki

The moves to 28 are the same as in Game 6 of the 15th Kisei title match between Kobayashi and Kato (see GW65). Cho chooses to atari at 29, even though that lets White hane at 32.



Dia. 1

Cho extended to 39 without exchanging A for White B. When Takemiya capped at 42, he spent a long time on his answer. If he defends

at C, White D becomes a good move [it nullifies the strength Black would have just built with 39 and C].





Figure 2 (43-93)

Figure 2 (43-93). Keen regrets by Cho

Black 43. Cho's aim is to move out in tandem with White — in the process White's moyo to the right will disappear.

Cho greatly regretted Black 49. He said he should have kept White separated with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*. After 6, Black can play 'a' or start a fight with Black 'b'—White 'a'—Black 'c'. Of course, with his strength to the left to back him up, White will not be afraid of this fight.



Dia. 2

White 50 is a good move: Black finds himself compelled to abandon the strategy in-

initiated by 43. He can't answer 50 at A, as White will launch the sequence in *Dia. 2*.

Dia. 2. If Black 1, White will link up with 2 and 4. White can't block at 'a', as White will cut at 'b' and his hane (50) will stop White from linking up along the edge. After the sequence to 15, White expands his top moyo with 16, and Black won't be happy with his game. The exchange of the marked stones stops Black from making good shape with 'c' [i.e., it doesn't block White off from the centre], which is why Cho regretted 49.

Cho spent one hour 32 minutes on 51 and one hour 21 minutes on 53 — 60% of his time allowance.

Black 51. If White answers at 68, Cho plans to block at A, letting White link up as in *Dia. 2*, then to take profit with B. This is a shrewd strategy: 51 is a decoy.

Takemiya plays safe with 52. In return for compromising at the bottom, he rapidly expands his centre with 72 on.

Black 83 is the only move — every extra move Black plays on the right helps White. However, he runs into a fierce attack in 84 to 88.




Figure 3 (94-130)

Figure 3 (94-130). *Living inside the moyo is not enough.*

The centre fighting is too complicated to analyse in the space we have available. Suffice it to say that it becomes apparent after Black lives inside the moyo up to 129 that this is not enough. When a moyo is big enough, destroy-

ing just one part of it is not enough. White was confident he had a win when he played 130.





Figure 4 (131-178)

61: ko (above 52); 66: ko



Dia. 3

Figure 4 (131-178). *No revenge for Cho*

White 42 caused a buzz of excitement in the pressroom, but 46 showed that Takemiya was not really interested in trying to kill the group. If he attacked with 1 in *Dia. 3*, the denouement would be unpleasant: White has no answer to 8.

Black 69 has no prospect of success.

This series showed up a new side of Takemiya in the courage he displayed in fighting back under pressure. Not so long ago the Honinbo title was synonymous with his name, but now he's not even in the league. Instead, he's threatening to make himself a fixture as Judan.

Black resigns after White 178.

(Kido, June 1991. Judan report translated by John Power)

The 16th Meijin Title Match



Kobayashi and Rin shake hands for the cameras before the start of the 1991 Meijin title match. The first game was held in Singapore.

On the surface, the 1991 Meijin title match may seem to have been a routine Kobayashi defence. The 4-1 score is his typical winning score — it's the margin by which he's won four of the seven Kisei title matches he's played in and three of the six Meijin title matches. However, the series was much closer than the score might indicate. In fact, it was one of the most fierce matches seen in the Meijin title for some time.

Rin had won the only previous title match played between these two, the 1990 Tengen, and his career record against Kobayashi stood at 27 wins to 23 losses, making him one of the few players with a plus record against Japan's number one.

On top of that, Rin seemed to have all the momentum, with his clean sweep of the Meijin league (covered in the previous issue). In contrast, Kobayashi's form had been a little ragged. His Honinbo challenge had collapsed when he lost four games straight and though he subsequently managed to defend his Gosei title, he was forced to go the full distance by a challenger, Kobayashi Satoru, whom he had

beaten with straight wins the previous year. All in all, it looked as if the strain of over half a decade of continuous title-match play was beginning to tell on him.

Kobayashi's own comments before the match lacked his usual self-confidence. 'I consider this match a crucial one in my career,' he said, showing that he was prepared for a tough struggle.

Ever since he took the Meijin title at the age of 23 in 1965, Rin has maintained his place at the top of the Japanese go world. His enthusiasm for study is probably the main factor in this enviable record. He never tires of analysing games he's played and will go all night if his partners are up to it. Kobayashi is known for his studiousness, but Rin undoubtedly runs him a close second. He is the centre of a private study group that meets regularly in his home and in which players such as O Rissei, O Meien, Kobayashi Satoru, Kataoka Satoshi and others participate.

Another factor in Rin's longevity, one that is pertinent to this match, is his flexibility. He started out playing a territorial game sup-

ported by precise calculation and accurate endgame, but when Ishida Yoshio outplayed him on the basis of similar skills, Rin completely recast himself as a player, becoming more aggressive and influence-oriented.

To cope with what he saw as one of the critical matches of his career, Kobayashi made a deliberate decision to match Rin's aggression. As the reader will see, that resulted in some exciting, hard-fought games.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Koichi Kisei, Meijin & Gosei

Black: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each.

Played in Singapore on 11, 12 September 1991.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan

From player to spectator

Kobayashi Sensei was clearly in bad form when he was playing the Gosei title match with me. If not, how could I have won two games? Even so, at the end he tightened up and wound up the match properly. From my point of view, I have to say I just wasn't strong enough. After winning two games through patient play, I got greedy — playing patiently in the final game was the main cause of my loss. As Kobayashi pointed out, I should have played defiantly, in the spirit of a challenger, and fought more boldly.

I went to Singapore as a spectator instead of as a player. Kobayashi's form was improving, and Rin was in good form to begin with. The prospect of a hard-fought best-of-seven made me feel a stir of excitement. The fiery clash of the first game lived up to my expectations. It was absorbing from start to finish, but what most impressed me was Kobayashi's attitude to the fuseki. Anyone can see that the fuseki is good for Black, but he alone maintains that it is not so bad for White. Someone like me is immediately swayed by other people's opinions, but Kobayashi is different. This is how the number one player has to be, I thought with admiration.

Figure 1 (1–23). *A move that wouldn't occur to me in a hundred years*

The 8–10 combination, the pincer of 16 — this is the inimitable Kobayashi fuseki. I

couldn't play 16. Surely the standard approach would be simply to play A, followed by Black B, White C, Black D, then cut and capture with White E.





Figure 1 (1–23)

Black 19 is quite a move. It was played quickly, so I asked Rin if he had researched it in advance, but he said it was a 'spur of the moment' move.



Dia. 1

White 20. This peep wouldn't occur to me in a hundred years. Black is proclaiming that he won't sacrifice 16 whatever happens. However, the position is tough for White after Black 23. That move works well with 19 — if White tries to break out with 1 in *Dia. 1*, then Black 19 turns out to be in just the right place after 2 to 6. If next White 'a', Black contains him with 'b'; if White uses 5 to cut at 'c', Black 'd' is a strong answer.




Figure 2 (24-52)
32: connects (at 25)

Figure 2 (24-52). Rin misses a decisive move.

Most players would want to hold black after the result to 36. I'm one of them. White has played efficiently, taking territory above and below and living on the side, but even so I would give the decision to Black's thickness. Rin was probably confident he was ahead.

Actually, however, he could have done even better. I didn't realize this until Nobuta Shigehito 6-dan pointed it out to me, but Black could have tried connecting at 1 in *Dia. 2* instead of 29. White has no choice but to cut with 2 and 4, whereupon Black plays 5 to 11. The only conclusion: White collapses. If next he attaches at 1 in *Dia. 3*, 2 is a clever answer. Anyone can see that the capturing race after 12 is favourable for Black. There's no point at which White can switch to another move to avoid collapsing. Using 5 to atari at 'a' doesn't change anything — even a ko is equivalent to collapse for White.


Rin trusted his opponent — if Kobayashi Meijin played it, there couldn't be a mistake — and missed the strongest move. However, even the result in the game is good enough.

So, White narrowly skirts disaster, and it's back to the fuseki.


For Black 37, pressing at A would be the ordinary move. That helps reinforce the cutting point of B and, above all, makes Black thick. But moves that slight territory don't find

favour with Rin. He takes a bite out of the corner with 37 to 41 and indirectly defends against the cut at B.


White 42. Surely extending to C would be the standard approach.



Dia. 2
8: connects



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Black 45. I would be only too happy to take the chance to extend to 1 in *Dia. 4*. If White 2, sealing him in with 3 will probably be sente. If White doesn't defend, he's not clearly alive after Black 'a' through 'g'. If Black 3 becomes sente, Black would clearly be ahead whatever answer he made on the top right.

Playing 45 on the right side only helps to make White 46 work all the better. The position White establishes at the top up to 52 couldn't be bettered. Black's left-side thickness becomes a little blurry, and the game takes a more leisurely turn.

The only thing is that not using 46 or 52 to make the sente peep of D was a slip. Kobayashi expressed keen regret over this later.





Figure 3 (53-80)

Figure 3 (53-80). *Forceful but best*

Black 53, punishing White for omitting the peep, is very severe. It's too late to peep now. The counter from 54 to 62 does feel a little over-aggressive, but there's no other way to play.

If White is playing the strongest possible moves, so is Black with the cuts of 63-65 and 69. The only thing is that there is less pressure on him, as he can afford to sacrifice the bottom group.


White 72. If White fills in liberties with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*, Black presses at 4 and sacrifices the group. Beyond argument, this result is good for Black.



Dia. 5

Black 73. If Black connects at 1 in *Dia. 6*, he can no longer block off the centre as in *Dia. 5*, so White plays 2 for a good result.

For the above reasons, the moves to 80 are inevitable.



Dia. 6





Figure 4 (81-100)

87: ko (at 81); 91: connects (right of 83)



Dia. 7

6: ko; 9: ko; 11: takes four stones

Figure 4 (81-100). *Cautious play leads to a protracted game.*


White 82. The best answer to 81 is probably 1 in *Dia. 7*. A ko is inevitable; the trade to 12 looks just a little favourable for Black perhaps.

However, the less-than-best move of 82 induced Rin to play cautiously, with the result that it became the best move. In a game there's no way of telling what will work best.

Taking the ko with 87 is slack. The trade in *Dia. 8* is superior to *Dia. 7*, insofar as the four

black stones haven't been taken off the board yet.

Next, Black 91 is very slack. Even now Black should start the ko in *Dia. 8*. Since the exchange of Black 'a'–White 'b' (89–90) has been played, connecting at 'c' might become a game-deciding move.



Dia. 8
6: ko




Figure 5 (101–134)


Figure 5 (101–134). *An all-out invasion summons victory.*

Black's response to the invasion with 1 on is standard. What is not standard is the deep invasion of 16. At first glance, I thought that this was reckless, that perhaps White was getting ready to resign, but that's absurd. White 16 is an absolutely essential move. Kobayashi's sureness of judgement at these critical points of the game is one of the secrets of his strength. Playing the safety-first move of 1 in *Dia. 9* would let Black seal off the side with 2 and take a secure lead of ten points on the board.


White seems to be in bad trouble when

Black attacks at 17, but clearly Kobayashi has read out exactly how to rescue his group. Two moves do the trick: the crude-looking move of 22 and the clever tesuji of 28. This is a fantastic rescue operation.

White 22 is a hard move to find, as Black can cut with the double peep of 27. That's why a player like me would probably compromise with 16 at 1 in *Dia. 9*. But that kind of weak-kneed move is not going to win you a title...



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

White 28 is a move that looks obvious when you see it, but perhaps Rin overlooked it. At this stage Black has no choice but to answer with 29. Once White connects at 30, Black is reluctant to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 10*. The centre falls to pieces, a loss that would outweigh Black's profit on the side.

If White simply played 28 at 30, Black would hack through at 34; if then White 28, Black would answer at A.

Black has to backtrack with 31 and 33, so White plays 34. He's settled his groups without paying a price — the best conceivable result for him. Not that that means that the game has turned in his favour — either because his start was just too bad or because Rin's judgement in the play at the bottom was correct.

Figure 6 (135–175). *A casually played forcing move helps White.*

Black 35 may have been facile. Without the exchange for 36, Black could start a fight here. Around 45, he could attach at Black 36, then

crosscut with A after White 35; in the ensuing fight he should be able to break into the top area, which should give him a win.

When all White's bad *aji* is eliminated with the uninspired forcing moves of 35 and 45-47, Black's lead seems to have been upset.

Capturing two stones with 68 is surprisingly small. Capturing the other two with White B would be better and would put White clearly ahead.




Figure 6 (135-175)




Figure 7 (176-276)
125: connects (at 114)

Figure 7 (176-276). Should have been a half-pointer

Black 81 is perhaps the losing move. There was no need for Black to worry about White's


playing a hane + connection in sente. Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11* are probably the best and biggest moves. Even if White hanes at 4, Black has the clever tesuji of 5 to 11 as counter. White ends in gote up to 14, which is hopeless. Playing White 8 at 14 would lose too many points. If White can't play 4 here, that means defending at 'a' is best. Having the 3-'a' exchange in place would in itself be a big improvement over permitting White 94, as in the figure. If play continues with Black 'b' as in the game, it will be a half-pointer. A half-pointer in which Black has better chances, I believe.

Finally, White 176 is worth two points plus. If Black had used 173 to capture at 176, he could have reduced his losing margin to 1 1/2 points.

This must have been a painful loss for Rin and for his many fans in Singapore.

White wins by 2 1/2 points.

(Kido, November 1991)



Dia. 11



Game Two

The players didn't have time to take it easy after coming back from Singapore. Kobayashi played an important game in the Judan tournament, and Rin flew to Taipei to play the first two games of the Tongyang Securities Cup final against Lee Changho. Their play showed no signs of fatigue, however, for this is another fierce fighting game. There are some similarities to the first game: once again Kobayashi lets himself be sealed off from the centre in the fuseki, leading to an early struggle that this time spreads all over the board.

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played at Izu Nagaoka in Shizuoka Prefecture on 25, 26 September 1991.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Defying White to attack — is Kobayashi a *shinogi* player?

Again Kobayashi plays the attach-and-block joseki of 9 and 11. He doesn't mind giving the opponent a bit of thickness.

With 14 and 16, Rin follows the same strategy as in the first game. Again Kobayashi invades immediately.

Black 23. Kobayashi wants to have his cake and eat it too: he goes for territory at the top as well as destroying White's side territory. White has to harass the side group to make the books balance.

Black 25 to 29 make bad shape (an empty triangle), but actually these are very effective moves.

Again Kobayashi goes for territory with 37 and 39, defying White to attack his centre group. The way Kobayashi is playing in this series one can't help wondering if he is turning into a *shinogi* player along the lines of Sakata. Certainly his fondness for creating weak groups is in the mould of the *shinogi* player [Shinogi is the art of rescuing weak groups in danger of being killed.]

White makes his second attempt to seal Black in with 40 to 46. These moves on a grand scale threaten to dominate the centre.

Figure 2 (51-100). Black's defiance triggers the decisive fight.

Black 53 is a 'raw peep', that is, it peeps at a point where Black could cut. The 'shape' move of A, however, would let White exchange 53 for Black B, then aim at the double peep of White C.





Figure 2 (51-100)


White 58. White decides to take aim at the centre white stones from a distance. Black responds by connecting defiantly at 59. In the pressroom, the players were looking at the light moves of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, but after the game Kobayashi commented: 'I didn't consider this. I wanted to make a frontal attack.' Rin's comment: 'White is supposed to be thick, but when Black connects, somehow his position

starts to look thin.'

White 62, the sealed move, surprised Kobayashi: he had expected a *kosumi* to the left of 66.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Black 65 startled the players in the pressroom. Kobayashi: 'I also considered Black 1 in *Dia. 2*. But 65 looked like the vital point to me. I really wanted to play there.' The severity of 65 is consistent with Kobayashi's approach in playing 59. Black 65 is, of course, a sacrifice to make shape at the top.

Black 77 and 79 bring on the first potentially game-deciding fight of the middle game. However, 79 should have been at 80, according to Kobayashi — White 80 is severe. The game now gets very complicated.

White 86 is also severe. White could instead play 86 at 100, driving Black up into the top centre, but 86 aims at killing Black.

Black 87 and 89 lose the *aji* of a corner invasion, but — Kobayashi: 'The game will be decided in the centre. I thought that these moves might not be sente later on.' Black 91 also helps White, but Black is worried about the possibility of White D after 93.

White may be attacking, but he also has to take care of his own centre-right group.

Did Rin overlook Black 95? In retrospect, one can say that 94 should have been at E or 100.




Figure 3 (101-137)

17: connects

Figure 3 (101-137). Black lives.

The sequence to 17 is a success for Black, as he settles his weak group by capturing six white stones. White 18 sets up a squeeze: A and B will be sente.

White 22 is necessary — if omitted, Black has the threat of C — so Black gets sente to switch to 23. However, White gains from getting a stone in place at 22, as will be seen later.

Black's invasion at 23 is successful, but the strength White builds with 24 to 30 makes Black's corner vulnerable.

Black 37 forestalls a hane here by White.

Meijin Tournament Prize Money

Winner of the title match: ¥25,000,000

Loser of the title match: ¥5,000,000

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1-dan: ¥59,000 2-dan: ¥64,000

3-dan: ¥71,000 4-dan: ¥76,000

5-dan: ¥147,000 6-dan: ¥158,000

7-dan: ¥180,000 8-dan: ¥191,000

9-dan: ¥224,000

Game fees for the third and final preliminary round: ¥360,000 (for all ranks)

Figure 4 (138–178). Rin's slip prolongs the contest.

White 38. White could also attack this group at 51, which might be harder to handle.

The climax of the game comes with White's spectacular placement at 54. This is the last area to be decided and it has had bad *aji* for a long time.

A nerve-wracking exchange follows, one in which both players make slips. First, Black 59 is a mistake. Correct is Black 1 in *Dia. 3*. After 5, the game will be close and Black will still have a chance of winning.






Figure 4 (138–178)

69: takes (at 61); 71: takes (above 48)



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

White's slip is 64, which fails to take advantage of the opportunity presented by 63. Instead, White could have pushed through at 1 in *Dia. 4*. It's all over after 3 and 5. If Black plays 4 at 5, White plays 4 and can't be killed. Using 2 to block at 3 is no good either, as demonstrated in *Dia. 5*.

Dia. 5. If Black 2, White cuts. After 6, White throws in at 7; if Black captures at 9, White ataris at 8, Black connects, and White cuts at 'a', so let's assume that Black connects at 8. Black loses the *semeai* that follows after 15.

Black 65 eliminates this possibility. After 68, Black compromises with 69, so this fight comes to an end.



Dia. 5




Figure 5 (179–276)

170: ko (at 110); 171: ko (right of 152);


172: connects ko (at 117)

Note that Black has to add a stone on the centre right.

Figure 5 (179–276). The reason for the loss?

As soon as the players had confirmed the score, Kobayashi commented: 'Black 159 [59 in Figure 4] was funny. I should have attached at


163.' Rin nodded in agreement.



Dia. 6

Just for the record, we should note that there was criticism of Kobayashi's fuseki by fellow professionals, specifically of his 'greediness' in trying to play at the top and on the right side with 17 to 23 in Figure 1. In a commentary in *Kido*, Takemiya professed himself unable to understand why Black made the pincer at 17 in Figure 1. He advocated following Dia. 6, giving White the right side. He further commented that, once having played 17 and 19, Black should continue with 23 at 1 in Dia. 7 to be consistent. With his centre-oriented style, of course, Takemiya would hate

to be confined to the side the way Kobayashi was in this game.



Dia. 7

As Meijin, Kobayashi should be allowed a word in his defence. 'The usual approach is to answer 16 at the top, I suppose. That would be more peaceful. But I wanted to fight.'

Kobayashi's comment can be applied to this whole series. Every game showed that it matched two players who 'wanted to fight'.

White wins by 2 1/2 points.

(Adapted from the Asahi Shimbun, with reference to *Kido*, November 1991.)



Game Three

This game is perhaps the masterpiece of the series. Rin Kaiho played one of those brilliancies you have to be 9-dan to understand and 9-kyu to enjoy. But it was not enough to win.

In most title matches there is a game that is the turning point, directing one player towards victory, the other towards defeat. In retrospect, this was the game

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played in Aomori City on 2, 3 October 1991.






Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1-50). Rin's innate style asserts itself.

Black 13. The one-space jump is often recommended for handicap games, but it's considered a little slack in even games.


White 14 is a relatively new move. With 16, White can also follow *Dia. 1* (assuming the ladder favours White, as it does here).

Black 19. If at 1 in *Dia. 2*, White plays the hane of 2. Black is short of liberties, making


White 8 sente, so the fight looks good for White.

Black 27. Once having played 25, Takemiya style would be to continue with Black A. White 28 is a good move, which is why Black could have forestalled it by exchanging A for White 46. Presumably he didn't want to help White to strengthen himself.

Black 29 took the players in the pressroom completely by surprise — it was the first of four such unpredictable moves in this game. Obviously Black doesn't want to push along at 30, which, by provoking White to extend to the right of 28, would be guilty of two sins: 'pushing the cart from behind' and driving White into Black's moyo. Even so, Black 29 looks like a 180-degree turn from Black's large-moyo strategy so far. Kojima Takaho 9-dan (the referee) commented: 'Favourably interpreted, it's a flexible move; it reverts to Rin's innate territorial style. Only a player who's flexible could play like this.'



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

The continuation to 35 is more or less inevitable. One way to evaluate Rin's strategy is to compare the result here to the hypothetical sequence in *Dia. 3*. Black 1 is an alternative to pushing along (at Black 2). It lets White secure a large side territory, but maintains Black's centre moyo. The difference in territory looks like 30 points, which perhaps explains why Rin played 29.

Black 37. Black should have played at B instead, but White misses his chance with 38. Kobayashi: 'White 38 was dubious. White clearly falls behind overall when he lets Black play first at the top with 43.' White should

have followed *Dia. 4*. White keeps sente with 1 and 3, so he can switch to 5. Kobayashi: 'This variation would give quite a reasonable game.'

Black 47, 49. Kobayashi: 'These moves astonished me. I expected the usual sequence of Black 51, White 49, Black 59 [see Figure 2].' By now it is clear that Rin has switched over completely to a territorial strategy.





Figure 2 (51-73)



Dia. 5

Figure 2 (51-73). Rin's brilliancy

When Black switches to the corner with a move like 49 in Figure 1, his intention is usually to make a trade, but here his aim is not only to live in the corner but also to hollow out White's top area. Such a greedy strategy requires considerable self-confidence.


White 56 starts the first hand-to-hand fighting of the game.

White 60 was the sealed move. 'What a place to have to seal a move,' Kobayashi groaned. One's first instinct would be to pull back at 1 in *Dia. 5*, but 'that's no good when Black jumps to 2' (Kobayashi). White can't omit 3, so Black moves out powerfully into the

centre with 4. White 60 and 62 are clearly designed to avoid this kind of development.

The continuation to 72 was what Kobayashi had expected. Rin then had a surprise for him in the form of the clamp at 73. This extraordinary move is the highlight of the game. In response —

Kojima 9-dan: 'Wanting to extend at 1 in *Dia. 6* is natural, but Black will counter with the strong move of 2. Cutting at 3 is the only move, as any other move will let Black cut off the white group above, but then Black 4 and 6 put him on the spot. Normally White could capture Black with 'a', but the marked black stone gets in the way. Black pushes through to the right of 4 and a ko follows. Having to fight a ko here would be unbearable. Black 73 is a move that Rin can really be proud of.'



Dia. 6







Figure 3 (74-100)



Dia. 7

Figure 3 (74-100). *Rin* misses a chance.

Having to connect docilely at 74 is extremely painful. Next, White plays 76 to move out — it's better than a simple *kosumi* at 78.


The *ponnuki* of 77 looks very good and of course the result represents a success for Black, but actually he had a better move.

Dia. 7. After exchanging 1 for 2, Black should atari on the outside at 3. The moves to 8 are more or less forced. This lets White settle his group, but Black walls off the centre right and gets sente to switch to 9 at the bottom, a move he has been very keen to play for a while. This sequence might have decided the game.

White 82. Note that White can't cut at 1 in

Dia. 8. Black counterattacks with 8 to 16 and also has the *hanedashi* of 'a', so White collapses.

The fighting comes to a pause after 85. Black has destroyed White's top territory and wiped out most of his centre thickness, so the result of his invasion strategy with 43 to 49 has been a success. The only drawback is that White is now able to poke his head out into the centre right with 86 and 88. This complicates the issue and keeps White in the game.



Dia. 8

Kobayashi launches a counterattack with 92; needless to say, his real aim is the centre group. Since Black reinforces at 93, the continuation is natural.





Figure 4 (101-125)

Figure 4 (101-125). *Rin's squeeze strategy*

White 10. Now it is Kobayashi's turn to play a brilliancy, though this move does not have the immediate impact on the spectator of 73 in Figure 2.

White 10 is part of Kobayashi's preparations for attacking in the centre. Just why it is


so clever requires a little explanation. In this game the question of whether Black A will be sente or not will be crucial. Thanks to 10, it won't be.



Dia. 9

Dia. 9. When White attacks with 1 and 3 (12 and 14 in the figure), Black would like to be able to counter with 4 and 6. The latter move threatens a cut, but White is able to defend against it in sente, thanks to 10 in the figure, so he has time to cut at 9. Black ends in gote, letting White switch to 17. This result looks like an easy win for White.

There is one problem, however. White B in the figure will be sente against the black group at any time; if so, doesn't White lose points by exchanging 10 for 11?




Dia. 10

Dia. 10. This diagram is the proof that White's move really is a brilliancy. If White keeps the contact play, 4 here, in reserve, Black can answer at 5. If White then cuts at 6, Black can counter with 7 and 9. In short, 4 doesn't work now.

Kojima: 'Kobayashi had read all this out. You've got to admire him. You can see why he's been Meijin for four years.'

If Black is absolutely determined to make A sente, he can do so but at a price. If he plays 11 at 1 in Dia. 11, then after he lives with 3, Black 'a' will be sente, but Black gives up too much on the side. Rin: 'I could never play like that. Pushing down at 11 is the only move.' The exchange here is an example of how much lies hidden below the surface of a top-level professional game.




Dia. 11

White 14 is therefore very severe. Rin spent 28 minutes of painful cogitation before changing direction with 15. This was another brilliancy that astonished the players in the pressroom.

Black 15 indicates a change in strategy, but one thing that hasn't changed is that Black has already decided to sacrifice this group. He is seeking the most effective way to do so.

White 16 is the best move. If White simply blocks at 17, that is, 1 in Dia. 12, Black lives with 2 to 6. Attacking his eye shape with White 'a' fails, as Black 'b' will be sente.

Black 17 and 19 set up a squeeze.



Dia. 12





Figure 5 (126-163)
47: connects (at 36)



Dia. 13

Figure 5 (126-163). A beautiful squeeze let down by complacency

The squeeze works out nicely for Black. The thickness Black builds in the centre proves its worth immediately, by making 55 absolutely sente.

Black 61 shows that Rin was confident of a win. If he had thought he were behind, he would have gone all out with A. The latter is superior to the usual move of B, because it also helps guard against a 3-3 invasion in the corner.

Actually Rin's judgement was correct: 61 is good enough, *assuming* correct endgame play follows.

After all the involved and hectic fighting in this game, the outcome is influenced by a surprisingly simple mistake, one for which overconfidence was again probably to blame. Instead of 63, there is no reason why Black can't block off this area with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12*. This would keep Black's lead safe.




Figure 6 (164-258)
147: ko (at 143); 156: ko (at 144)
158: connects (at 143)

Figure 6 (164-258). Finally, the upset

The lead does not actually change hands until White plays 92 in sente. Black had to forestall this, and he could have. Instead of 89, Black should play at 91; if the liberties are filled in, Black will be able to aim at pushing out at 90, so White won't be able to play 92. White will therefore answer 91 at 96, after which Black can exchange 89 for 90, then throw in at 94.

With 92, White gains two points in sente and upsets Black's lead.

Kobayashi had plenty of time left, so after 92 he played slowly and carefully, making sure Rin didn't get another chance.

It was surmised that when Rin played 61 in Figure 5 he may have been overestimating the size of his lead. He confirmed this the next day. 'I was a little out in my counting . . . If I had realized this and played 61 in Figure 5 at A, I wouldn't have lost so easily.'

It's certainly unusual for Rin to lose so many points in the endgame. As has often been noted by professionals, a psychological factor comes into play: it's hard to go all out and take risks when you are ahead, but there is nothing more dangerous than trying to coast to a win.

Despite the disappointing ending for Rin fans, this was an interesting and dramatic game, with more than its share of unexpected

moves. It will probably be remembered as one of the great games in the history of the Meijin title.

White wins by 3.1/2 points.
(Adapted from the Asahi Shimbun)

Game Four

The furious pace established in this match was more than maintained in the fourth game, which is another very aggressive fighting encounter. In particular, the boldness of Rin's play was conspicuous.

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Kyoto on 16, 17 October 1991.

Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-45)

Figure 1 (1-45). Rin's fuseki innovation

The atmosphere in this game became tense almost immediately when Rin played 8. Kobayashi muttered to himself (Rin had left the room): 'A new move's been sprung on me. Is it a new move kept just for today?'


When Black plays 7, the standard counter-pincer is White A. After Black B, then White C and Black D follow. Actually this is one of Kobayashi's 'sure-win' patterns (with white) and he played it in the 1991 Japan-China Meijin playoff — see GW64. According to Kobayashi, he can't remember losing with it.

Recently the high move of E has also ap-

peared. Moving one line further away with 8 is Rin's innovation. The logic is that if Black B-D do follow, then the further away White is from Black's thickness the better.

In view of that, Black can't very well play 9 at B, though it's hardly a move that would lose a game. Kobayashi commented that he expected to see 8 imitated by other players and he added: 'I didn't have confidence in 9. This is a position for further study. I couldn't think forever, so I extended to 9 as the premise for attaching at 11.' The aim of 9 is to make White's upcoming two-space extension over-concentrated.

The sequence from 20 to 24 was queried by some players. These moves forestall Black F in sente, but they also weaken White's centre bottom group. After this White comes under considerable pressure.



Rin decides to secure a position in the bottom right corner before looking after the centre bottom group. However, the 33-35 combination is severe.

White wants to play both 36 and 37, but of the two 36 is the more urgent — a black move at G would be much too severe.

White 40. If White defends against the peep of 39 with 1 in Dia. 1, he will be in bad trouble after 2 and 4. The centre bottom group is looking a little forlorn, while Black also has the threat of 'a'.

White 44 is a bold move that determines the course of the game. White's corner group is not yet alive, yet he seals Black in instead of defending. The fight that follows is by no means easy to understand for amateurs, but we hope our commentary gives some idea of the dynamics of the situation.

To isolate the corner as a life-and-death problem, let's assume that Black has added the marked stones in Dia. 2. Even if White now plays 1, Black can kill him with the 2-4 combination.





Figure 2 (46-84)



Dia. 3

15: connects


Figure 2 (46-84). Rin's boldness pays off.

Rin's play here (44 on) aroused speculation that he might have made a misreading, but rather it was an overflow of aggression. Living would be easy — instead of 50, White just crawls at 55, forcing Black to defend on the outside, then adds a stone on the inside — but this would be painfully submissive. Kobayashi's reaction to 50: 'What a fantastic move White had here. I didn't see it coming.'

Though it is obviously the sequence expected of him by the opponent, Black falls in line with 51 and 53. The major turning point then comes with 57: Black decides not to try to kill White, which in turn means that Rin's policy of defiance has borne fruit. The reason for his caution is shown in Dia. 3.

Dia. 3. The sequence here is long but inevitable. Black 1 is the vital point for destroying White's eye shape, but White sacrifices the group in return for a squeeze on the outside, first with 8 to 14, then in the centre. Black will be forced to take the white group off the board (*semedomi*), so this is not enough compensation for the massive thickness White gains.

Forcing with 58 and 60 before living with 62 is very well timed. The fight ends when Black makes shape with 63 and 65. (Note that Black gains nothing by pushing through above or to the left of 61.)



Dia. 4

White 66, an approach move on the narrower side, shows how much Rin's fighting spirit has been aroused. Reinforcing with 1 to 5 in Dia. 4 would be more peaceful (White could also play 3 at 4, Black 'a', White 3).

Kobayashi matched his aggression with 67, but Rin commented later that he was grateful for this move. Kobayashi: 'This game is unusual for the small number of moves that I regret. But 67 is a move I'm still unhappy about. Simply playing 67 at 69 would have made it harder for White to decide on his answer. If he were to play at White 67, pushing along one space above would make much better shape for Black.'

Black 75 is a sacrifice to ensure Black keeps sente after 77.

Black 81 is severe. Rin allowed that perhaps he should simply have made a one-space jump with 80.

White 84, the sealed move, took some people by surprise, as it is the most straightforward move, but Kobayashi was certain Rin would play here and was ready immediately with 85.

Overnight the feeling among professionals was that the game was good for White, whose all-out play had secured him more territory than Black in the bottom half of the board.





Figure 3 (85-121)

Figure 3 (85-121). Kobayashi makes his challenge.

White 88 is a good point. Kobayashi commented that 'I felt I was about two points behind.' Perhaps that's why he went for profit with 89 to 95. Rin also believed he was ahead, which is why he didn't fight with 92 to the left of 88.

White 96 is important. It may seem to be too close to the strong black position to the right, but it offers some assistance to the centre-right group while forestalling Black 96.

Black 105 starts the final fight. White 106 and 108 may seem aggressive, but White can't let Black build real territory on the side if he is to maintain his lead. If White simply plays 108 at 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black will make a severe attack on the group below with 2 to 8. It's not easy to win a game with a purely territorial move like White 1.



Dia. 5

The virtue of 108 is that it enables White to reinforce the bottom group with 112; the drawback is that it leaves a weak point at 119.

Black takes out a little insurance for his large group with 117 before invading at 119. This looks like a bold move, inviting as it does a double attack at 120, but this is Kobayashi's challenge for victory.






Figure 4 (122-167)



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Figure 4 (122-167). The issue is decided.

When White blocks Black's path into the centre with 24, the game becomes extremely difficult.

White 26. If at 29, Black jumps to A; White can't cut with B, as Black will give way and, if White keeps coming, capture the three marked stones on the side.

Black 33 is the decisive move. White has no good answer. If he cuts at 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black uses the cut of 2 to live in the corner. This would give him a big lead. Blocking on the other side, at 1 in *Dia. 7*, is no good either: after Black 6, White can't link up with one move in the centre, so he collapses.

The only move left is 34, but this also lets Black destroy corner territory with 35 on.

Black has taken the lead.

Rin attacks with 40 and 42, but instead of cutting at 67 Black can afford to back away from the fight with 45.

The players later agreed that White would have had a better chance if he had used 30 to start a fight with 40, as at that stage Black could not have walked away from the fight as he does in the game.

Even though he knows it's not going to work, White has no choice but to cut at 46.

White 54. If at 55, Black cuts to the left of 55, White plays 56, Black plays 60, and White collapses. White has to retreat with 54, but this trade sets the seal on victory for Black.




Figure 5 (168-241)

Figure 5 (168-241). Assessing the lead

When the players counted the score, Black seemed to have a seven-point win on the board. Kobayashi looked dubious. 'I confirmed a number of times that I was ten points ahead on the board. Then when I was able to play the hane and connection of 119 and 121 I thought it might be 11 points. It's funny — how could I be four points out?'

Rin also looked puzzled. If the game was so close, then he might have been able to try something in the endgame . . . Suddenly Rin realized what was wrong. In his exhaustion, he had rearranged Black's top territory as 44 points but counted it as 40. Needless to say, a slip like this is quite unusual with professionals.

Takagi Shoichi 9-dan commented that this game was a victory for Kobayashi's patience and tenacity in hanging on in an unfavourable position. 'The way he turned the game from chaos to a win shows his true strength,' Takagi said.

Kobayashi: 'There's no one who could have made an accurate positional assessment in this game. It was too difficult.' This is an interesting comment from someone who, at move 88, assessed his opponent's lead at two points. Asked how he arrived at this figure, Kobayashi replied: 'It's simple. You just have to ask yourself: which side would I take if Black got an extra point? If Black got an extra two points? The answer presents itself. In that position, I thought the game would be level if Black got two points.'

Black wins by 5 1/2 points.

(Adapted from the Asahi)

Game Five

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played in Tokyo on 23, 24 October 1991.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.





Figure 1 (1-25)

Figure 1 (1-25). Yet another new pattern


There have been a lot of new patterns in this series, and this game starts off with what is probably another new pattern on the bottom right.

The moves to 14 seem inevitable. When Black pincers at 7, one naturally feels like trying to settle oneself with 8; if Black 9, you then want to go for the corner with 10. If Black plays 9 at 12, the idea is to settle yourself by cutting at 10. If instead Black plays 9 at 11, White will push along at 9.

The opinion was expressed that Black gets a superior result up to 17, so White should have tried a different variation somewhere, but I can't agree. I did consider playing 12 at 1 in *Dia. 1*. Black 2 to 8 will probably follow. In this shape, striking at the vital point of 'a' becomes a good move for Black, so it's hard to say whether this is better than the game.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

I wouldn't want to jump to 17 if I were Black. I would probably switch to the large point of 1 in *Dia. 2*. If White splits Black with 2 and 4, then Black plays 3 to 7.

Well, Rin's 17 is a splendid move in its own right. The key will be whether White's stone at 6 lives or dies.

I had a feeling Black would make the pin-


cer at 19. Another possible strategy is playing 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*. White can't set his solitary stone in motion directly, so I suppose he will invade at 'a'.



Dia. 3

No matter how much I may like territory, I can hardly choose the joseki of White A (for 20), Black B, White C, Black D, White E, Black F. If Black takes the outside, White will lose any chance he has of moving out with 6.

I was often taken by surprise by Rin's moves in this series. That also applies to Black 25. My reading was frustrated. This is a matter of fighting spirit that transcends the question of the actual merit of the move. Rin seemed determined not to play ordinary moves.



Dia. 4

The move I expected for 25 was the knight's move of 1 in *Dia. 4*. White will play 2 and 4, then after the moves to 9 move out with 34 in Figure 2. If Black plays the usual move of 1 at 'a', White gets just what he wants with 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.





Figure 2 (25-61)



Dia. 5

Figure 2 (25-61). Moving out with confidence


Black 31 also took me by surprise. I expected Rin to crawl once more at 32; after White A, White B is not sente against the corner. The only thing is that striking at the vital point of C becomes less of a threat. Rin prefers to play patiently, keeping alive the threat of C.

Incidentally, Sakai 9-dan suggested using 31 to play the probe of 1 in *Dia. 5*. This is certainly a brilliant idea. It didn't occur to me at all. White 2 helps Black to defend at 3, and Black takes aim at 'a'. White would probably block at 'b', forcing Black 'c', then go back and defend at 'a'.


When I ran out at 34, I had absolute confidence. I felt that this made the game interesting for me. Perhaps Black overlooked this move because he is so thick around here.

Answering the peep of 35 by crawling at 36 is important. If White simply connects at 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black forces with 2, then attacks at the

'corner' with 4. This is hard on White. When Black continues patiently up to 10, White finds he has done little more than create some burdensome luggage. If White plays 7 at 'a', Black plays 8, White 'b', Black 'c', creating the threat of a hane at 'd'.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Instead of 41, a more frightening move is Black D, sealing White in by brute force. I intended to think about it if and when it was actually played. It looks as if White can settle himself by attaching at E.

When White smoothly extricates himself with 44, you can no longer say that Black's position is thick. The game looks very promising for White.

Black 47 was criticized as too slow. Because the shoulder hit of 48 is too good. Perhaps Black should play something in the centre like 1 in *Dia. 7*. If White defends against 'a' with 2, Black also defends with 3. White then plays 4, and his position doesn't look bad to me.

Using Black 49 or 53 to connect with Black 54 is hopeless: White 53, Black F, White G. However, when Black plays 53, White gratefully accepts a stone with 54.





Figure 3 (62-100)

69: ko; 72: ko; 74: connects



Dia. 8


5: connects

Figure 3 (62-100). *The numbers add up.*


Rin plays a do-or-die move (61), attempting to break out of an unfavourable position with a ko. If White gets carried away and ataris at 1 in *Dia. 8*, he will get into bad trouble. After the usual sequence to 6, White can't omit 7, so with one blow at 8 it's all over. White is not afraid of 8 when he has a stone at 62 in the figure.

I couldn't win the ko, so I intended to cede the bottom right. I was surprised when Rin blocked my way out with 71. Rin later commented that perhaps he should have finished off the ko with 1 in *Dia. 9*. Even if White tries to attack with 2, Black should be able to take sente with 3 to 9 and switch to 11. If White connects at 'a', Black makes one eye in the centre in sente with 'b-d', which, with his gote eye at the bottom, makes it inconceivable that the group will die. Consequently, instead of

playing a move with such uncertain prospects as 2, I would probably force with 'e', then take up position with 'f'. That should be OK for White.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

With 71 Rin is hoping to complicate the game. However, White's profit from winning the ko that Black started is substantial, and, considering that White's bottom group can't be caught, the figures already add up to a win.


Black 75. White would have reason to be frightened if Black A worked, but when White played 75 in sente (threatening to link up), then moved out with 83, Black would have no chance of catching him. That reminds me, Rin regretted not making the hane of B before this.

White 82 is a perplexing point. If White had no confidence in his position, he would probably extend at 1 in *Dia. 10*. This is extremely big. If Black 2 and 4, he twists away

with 3 and 5; though he remains a little uneasy about the group, playing like this should be feasible for White.

White 82 is also certainly big. What White is saying is that permitting the ponnuki of 83 and 85 is OK, since he has already made forcing moves here.

I believed that even if the game got close I was certain to keep some of the komi. My plan was to play solidly and not give the opponent any chance of catching me off guard. Rin, after all, is known for his awesome ability to pull off upsets.



Dia. 11

Dia. 12




Figure 4 (101-112)

Figure 4 (101-112). A dangerous moment

It seems that there would have been no problem with extending at 1 in Dia. 11 instead of 4. I thought that having Black rip off two stones with 2 to 8 would have been unbearable, but White gets good shape with 7 and can switch to A in the figure, getting a slightly more profitable result.

There was a dangerous moment for me when Black captured with 5. My plan was to crawl immediately at 1 in Dia. 12. If Black 2, White jumps to 3, and even if his connection is severed, he lives after 7. That is how I read it, but instead of either 4 or 6 Black could push up at 7. White would have no choice but to link up on the side with 6, so Black hanes at 'a', making it impossible for White to link up.



The moment of victory: Kobayashi wins his fourth Meijin title in a row.

I broke out in a cold sweat when I realized. In every game of go there's a moment when you get a jolt. After 6 in the figure White is safe. Even if Black plays 9 at 11, then cuts at 12 after White B, White gets a geta with C, Black D, White E, Black F, White G.

Figure 5 (113–257). *Four in a row*

For White 74, answering to the right of 73 is correct. White loses one or two points here. Even so, this is the only game in which I thought that I played well.

White wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Kido, December 1991. Translated by John Power.)

With this win, Kobayashi took his record to four Meijin titles in a row and five overall. Even though he defeated Rin 4–1, the series certainly qualifies as one of his toughest struggles. The varied and aggressive play of both Rin and Kobayashi certainly makes it one of

the most memorable matches of recent times.




Figure 5 (113–257)

82: connects (at 45); 119: retakes (at 65)

157: connects (at 88)

Each side connects a ko.

The 4th Japan–China Meijin Playoff

Another Triumph for Kobayashi



Kobayashi's dominance in the Meijin playoff continues. Here he is seen (on right) reviewing his eighth straight win. Kobayashi has won every one of the 16 games he has played to date in China. (Next to Ma is Chen Zude.)

Once again Kobayashi Koichi has proven himself the most reliable player Japan has in the international arena. In the 4th annual playoff between the Japanese Meijin and the Chinese Mingren, Kobayashi bested Ma Xiaochun of China 2-0, extending his unbeaten run in this series to eight games and further enhancing his reputation of invincibility against Chinese players.

Defeating Kobayashi in this playoff seems to have become Ma's greatest ambition. According to Ma, it was his desire to challenge Kobayashi once again that spurred him on to fight back from a 0-2 deficit in the 4th Mingren title match. He showed his mettle by beating the challenger, China's top player Nie Weiping, three games straight to defend his title, but against Kobayashi he was frustrated for the third year in a row. The only consolation for Ma was that for the first time he had a winning position at one stage (in the second game).

After this victory, Kobayashi had a daunting record against Chinese players of 26 wins to 3 losses, a winning percentage of 89.65. That's a level of success without parallel in international go. To see how he did it, here are commentaries on the games from the 4th playoff.

Game One

White: Ma Xiaochun Mingren

Black: Kobayashi Koichi Meijin

Played at the Japan-China Youth Exchange Centre in Beijing on 10 December 1991.

Figure 1 (1-31). *Black's good move*

White 6 and 8 show that Ma wants to play a leisurely game. Kobayashi opposes that strategy with the aggressive pincer of 15.

White 20 is a turning point. White could also exchange White 23 for Black A, then settle his group by descending at B. However, Black would then build a nice position by extending to C.

Ma played 20 out of dislike for this, but after 25 it ends up too close to Black's thickness, as well as giving Black an effective extension to 29. The conclusion is that invading at C would have been better than 20.





Figure 1 (1-31)



Black 23 is a good move that foils White's aim with 22. When White exchanges 24 for 25, his stone at 18 becomes superfluous, yet if he wedges in at 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black will be happy to discard a stone in exchange for taking a firm grip on White's stone on the side. This result would be very good for Black.

Kobayashi: 'White 22 is asking Black to extend at D, but if the moves to 5 in *Dia. 1* then follow, extending at D is not an essential move.'

The result to 31 is painful for White.

Figure 2 (32-63). *Missing the chance to play 'Kobayashi-style'*

Black 33 is a calm move. If Black makes a hane at 1 in *Dia. 2*, White 2 will put him on the

spot. Because of the cutting point at 'a', Black will have to defend with 5, letting White link up with 6. Suddenly Black's positions look thin.

White decides to sacrifice his stone with 34. Black is satisfied with securing nearly 20 points on the side on top of his profit at the bottom.





Figure 2 (32-63)



Dia. 3

Black 39 is the only move Kobayashi regretted in this game. He later called it 'slack'. Instead, Black should play 1 in *Dia. 3*, bad style though it is. The sequence to 7 is 'more like the Kobayashi style,' he said. Black gets sente to play at 9 and he is ahead. The only thing he has to worry about is the expansion of White's bottom right moyo, but all of Black's groups are solid, so he should have no trouble reduc-


ing the moyo.

Kobayashi: 'I felt Ma's talent in White 46 and 48.' If Black answers 48 by blocking to the right of 41, White attaches two spaces above 40; letting White build strength here would expose the isolated black stone at 47 to danger.


Black 53 is crude but takes sente. Kobayashi: 'Connecting [above 48] is probably the proper move, but I was in a hurry to play 55.'

Black 55 is a good move. He is not afraid of a peep at 1 in *Dia. 4*. White's entire thickness disappears in the continuation to 10.

When Black strengthens his last weak group with 57, the pressure is really on White to do something. His first step is 58, but the peep of 59 is a superb answer. If White answers at 62, Black secures a large corner territory with Black 60, White A, Black B, yet when White answers at 60, Black forces with 61, then lives with 63.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Instead of 59, it is tempting to attach at C or D, but in either case White will hane and capture the contact stone, leaving Black with a thin position.

Figure 3 (64-121) (next page). Victory in sight

White must have racked his brains as to how to deal with Black's peep (the marked stone). He decides to counter with 64 and 66, but with the latter move he must have hallucinated something: it becomes the losing move.

Ma must have overlooked the placement of 67, which sets up a squeeze and enables Black

to build centre thickness. That in turn limits White's moyo potential and also menaces his group on the top right. Black now has a winning position.




Figure 3 (64-121)

White should have played 66 at 1 in *Dia. 5* (previous page). Black will force once with 2, then switch to 4 (or 'a'). This keeps the lead for Black, but White had no other choice. Note that if White attacks the corner with 7 and 9, Black is safe after 10.

White 76 is a do-or-die move. Kobayashi considered it unreasonable, but White 77 would not have made a contest of the game.

White 92. White has to answer patiently — if he hanes above 92, Black will counter-hane. Helping Black to build centre thickness here would endanger the white group on the bottom left.

Kobayashi plays decisively now. Black 93 urges White to play 96. He then blocks with 99 and 101, forcing White to seek life with 106. Black continues to harass this group with 111, 113, and 115.

Kobayashi: 'Black can't lose after he captures a stone with 121.'

Figure 4 (122-183). One last challenge

Black 23 is another effective move.

After 41, White's formerly thick group becomes thin.

Black 51 is the vital point. White must play 52 to forestall Black 74.





Figure 4 (122-183)
ko (over 23): 27, 30, 33, 36



Dia. 6

White 62 is a final show of defiance. White could easily live with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6*, but when he hanes at 'a' later, Black can answer at 'b'; capturing with Black 'c' will be atari, so White can hardly fight the ko.

Black 63 is the coup de grace. Cutting at 72 doesn't make an eye. The People's Daily published Nie Weiping's summing up of this game: 'White was overwhelmed by Black throughout and never had a chance to counterattack.'

White resigns after Black 183.

Game Two

This is the game Ma will remember — and regret — from all his encounters with Kobayashi: it was the first in which he had at one stage a serious chance of winning.

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Ma Xiaochun

Played on 12 December 1991.




Figure 1 (1-66)

Figure 1 (1-66). A questionable trade

White 12 foils Black's opening strategy. If White makes an approach move on the upper right, Black will play a pincer, which would combine well with his 'mini-Chinese opening' framework on the left side.

Black 15 is an individualistic move. It can either be praised as making balance with 3 and 9 or criticized as being too distant to combine well with them. The usual way of building up Black's moyo would be with a shoulder hit one line below 40.

Black 15 surprised Kobayashi and so did 17. Kobayashi: 'Instead of 17, I would play the shoulder hit or at A. I felt a little grateful for 17.'

White 18 is a carefully planned move. If instead White 23, his stone will be too cramped after Black 37.

Black 23 is a good, calm move. If White simply jumps out (to the right of 29) with 24, Black's shoulder hit below 40 will work very well. It would maintain the pressure on White and probably build up a winning position for Black.

Kobayashi's answer to the problem he is faced with is the 24-26 combination. This allows Black to make a *ponnuki*, but has the virtue of securely connecting White's groups.

Nie Weiping, Liu Xiaoguang and other Chinese players in the pressroom thought that Black had a clear lead. Ma also thought that he was ahead, but Kobayashi wouldn't agree. 'If Black had used 17 to make the shoulder hit, he would have got a fantastic territorial moyo. Instead, White has split open the side and limited Black's territory, all in sente, so I don't think it's bad for White. At worst, it's even.'


White 46 leads to an unexpected fight. The aim of 46 is to make Black overconcentrated on the left side. Black is too impatient to let White have his own way — Black 47 at 62, White 47, Black 54, White 49, Black 58 — he rebels.

Black drives a wedge into the bottom area with 53 to 57, but the exchange to 66 can hardly be called a trade. Fujisawa Shuko, who examined the game record later, looked puzzled at this point. 'It's not a game after the three stones are captured. It's all over. Did Ma make a misreading?'

Kobayashi: 'Connecting on top at 54 is a good move. Ma probably overlooked it. So if I were Black, I would patiently play the usual hane at 62 instead of 47. Or I would consider fighting with 63 at 64, to stop White from capturing the three stones.'

Dia. 1. If Black 1, a ko follows. White sacrifices the corner to win the ko, then attacks with all his might at 16. This was Kobayashi's plan. He believed that the game would have been even.

Ma read out this variation, but chose the facile move of 63. Perhaps he overestimated the worth of his gain in the earlier fight on the top left.



Dia. 1 7, 10: ko




Figure 2 (67-100)


Figure 2 (67-100). *Self-criticism*

White 68 makes good use of White's thickness to the left. Black has to submit with 69 and 71.

Kobayashi regretted 78. 'This is overdoing things. Playing such a heavy move shows that I'm still a hopeless player. Why didn't I see the light move of 1 in *Dia. 2*? Black can't omit 2, so White can gouge out Black's base with 3 and 5. White can aim at attacking at 'a' and linking up with 'b'. This would have avoided complications.' This is high-level self-criticism: no one in the pressroom reacted to 78.

White 88. Having to add this stone is the drawback of 78. Even so, Kobayashi looked full of confidence at this stage.

By Black 97, the game seems to be getting close. Some players advocated playing 97 at 98. Kobayashi: 'White would answer Black 98 by forcing with A and B, then capping with C. Doesn't that make the game quite tough for Black?'



Dia. 2





Figure 3 (101-150)



Dia. 3

Figure 3 (101-150). *Ma catches up.*

White 4 launches an operation designed to build territory in the centre. That's OK, but Kobayashi goes wrong in the timing of 12 and 14. After the game, Ma showed *Dia. 3* to Kobayashi.

Dia. 3. White simply blocks at 1. If Black answers at 2 as in the game, White plays the thick move of 3. Black will defend at 6, as White 6 would aim at attacking with a placement in the corner, so White can then switch to 7 (or a cap three lines left of 7).

Kobayashi: 'It's just as Ma said. This variation would have made the game even on the board. My play became facile because I believed the game was a very easy win. What with adding to my territory with 30 and 38, I thought that the gap had widened. That shows how complacent I was.'

The truth was different. Step by step, Black was closing the gap. Black 17 is big; a clever forcing sequence from 27 to 35 makes the game

even closer. Next, Black 37 is the biggest move. Black has finally drawn level. Kobayashi alone remainly blithely unaware.

Black 39 is a shrewd move, limiting White's territory up to 50.

Ma's only problem was that he had run out of time and had started *byo-yomi*.





Figure 4 (151-240)
94: connects (below 92)



Dia. 4


Figure 4 (151-240). *So near and yet so far*

Black 77 is the biggest but not the best move. After the game Ma immediately pointed to 84 with an expression full of regret. If he had played there, he would have won.

Kobayashi: ' "Ridiculous!" I thought, but Ma was counting better. If Black exchanges Black 84 for White 119, switches to 77, then 78 to 83 follow as in the game, with White 89 and Black 108 coming next, then the game would certainly have been a half-point win for Black.'

White 84 should have been the decisive move, but Kobayashi went wrong after this. White 90 had to be 1 in *Dia. 4*. Black 2 is the only move, so White turns the centre into a wasteland while reducing Black's territory with 3 and 5. This way White wins by at least half a point and maybe a point and a half.

After Black squeezes with 91 and 93, the game again becomes a toss-up.



Dia. 5


The Chinese players in the pressroom had become quite animated at this stage, but after Black 95 they sank into silence. The reason was apprehension: Liu Xiaoguang had discovered a deadly move for White. Instead of 96 –

Dia. 5. White plays at 1, though this loses a full point plus. When Black plays 2, White forces with 3. Giving up the stone would lose, so Black has to connect, but then White strikes at 5. Black can't save his four cut-off stones.

There was great relief when Kobayashi played 96 and 98: China's first win seemed to be drawing nearer. But the excitement did not last long.

Kobayashi: 'Black 99 is probably the losing move. If Black had gone all out with 1 in *Dia. 6* (next page), I would have lost by half a point.' White has to link up his eyeless group, so Black can then switch to 9. Compared to the figure, where the centre becomes a wasteland, Black's territory there increases by about two points. That would have made all the difference.

Extending at 100 secures victory for White.



Dia. 6

'Eight wins in a row? That's a lot of wins. Enough to force the other side to a handicap twice over,' said Kobayashi [referring to the *uchikomi* system, under which the handicap was changed when one player took a lead of four games]. But he added: 'Each time I win it becomes more and more painful. I wonder if

people realize this.

The more he wins, the greater the fear of the loss that may come next. This is a burden that only the top player has to bear.

In the midst of his disappointment, Ma found words to console himself. 'I had more chances in this game than any before. I feel that the gap between me and Kobayashi Meijin has narrowed.'

Ma certainly had his share of chances in the endgame, but to some degree that was due to Kobayashi's habitual optimism. The verdict on how narrow the gap has become must wait for another year.

Ma: 'It's finally become a real contest. I hope to defend my title next year and meet Kobayashi again in Tokyo.'

White wins by 1 1/2 points.

(Kido, February 1992 and the Asahi Shimbun. Translated by John Power.)

Go World News

Continued from page 6.

Death of Fujisawa Hosai

Fujisawa Hosai, one of the top players of mid-20th century go, died of a stomach ulcer on 2 August. He was 73 years old.

Fujisawa was one of the most individualistic figures in modern go. He will always be remembered for the great success of his life and the great failure: becoming the first 9-dan produced by the Oteai or rating tournament and his losses to Go Seigen in two celebrated *jubango* (ten-game matches) in the 1950s. Although he never took a top title, Hosai was always a member of the top group during the 50s and 60s and he won the Oza title in 1958 and the Judan title in 1964 (the year that Sakata won every other open title).

On and off the go board, Hosai was known for his fierce independence and his hatred of compromise. Like Kitani, he would try to read out everything, which made him a very slow player; for a long time he held the record for the slowest move, three hours 33 minutes in a Meijin-league game. On the other hand, he enjoyed good results in *haya-go* tournaments.


During the 70s, Hosai served a number of terms as a Nihon Ki-in director, including a

period at the Overseas Department. During the last few years his health was bad, but he refused to retire until April this year.


(Continued on page 64)

Life and Death Problems


Ezura Yuichi 7-dan



Problem 1



Problem 2



Problem 3

In Problems 1 and 2 Black can get a ko. In Problem 3 he can live in the corner.

Answers on page 64.


The Myriad Techniques of Go

by Sato Masaharu 9-dan


In this issue we look at various kinds of *semeai* or capturing races. The basic principle of capturing races is that the side with more liberties wins, but unfortunately more than simple counting is involved, as the issue is

complicated by eye-shape and the possibility of kos.


The following problems have a twist in them somewhere. We hope you find them interesting.




1. Black to play and live in the corner.




2. Black to play. Black A obviously loses to B. How can he win the fight (ko is not enough)?




3. Black to play. He doesn't have many liberties, but he can still win the fight.



4. Black to play. Black's five stones have a lot of liberties, but that's no use unless he can cut off the three marked stones.



5. Black to play. White's three stones have only three liberties, but after Black 'a'—White 'b' Black only has two. Can you find a way for him to extend his liberties after that? (A ko is not enough.)



6. Can you find a way for Black to rescue his six cut-off stones? Hint: the answer is a ko.

Answers on page 54.

Efficiency (5)


Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Making efficient extensions


In this issue I would like to discuss a problem that arises in every game you play: how to make efficient extensions. Let's start by immediately looking at some examples.

Dia. 1. In this kind of position, with corner enclosures facing each other, everyone knows that occupying the centre point with 1 is a very good move. If White answers at 2, Black jumps to 3, building an excellent position. Let's assume White also jumps to 4: it's obvious that

Black has the superior position, all thanks to having taken the centre point.




Dia. 1: take the centre point!



Dia. 2: why hold back?


Dia. 2. There is no need to hold back at 1. If the players continue in similar fashion to *Dia. 1*, they get positions that are roughly symmetrical, but that means that Black is not maintaining the advantage of having had the first move.

Dia. 3. What if Black is greedy and goes as far as 1? If White answers at 2, he encloses the top with 3 and can be satisfied with having built an efficient position. However, it is too much to expect White to be so obliging.




Dia. 3: too much to hope for

Dia. 4. White is much more likely to counter by invading at 2. If Black settles himself with 3, White does likewise with 4. The result is quite a contrast to *Dia. 1*: once again Black has failed to maintain the advantage of the first move.




Dia. 4: equal



Dia. 5: a fight

Dia. 5. If Black plays more aggressively, attacking at 3 to stop White from securing a base, White will probably play just as aggressively with 4. It's not clear that Black has maintained the advantage of the first move. Of course, he has reasonable prospects in the fight that follows Black 'a', but this takes us into the middle game.


Choosing the right point is relatively straightforward when two corner enclosures face each other. However, things are different when it's a corner enclosure facing a star-point stone.




Dia. 6: common sense

Dia. 6. I think that you will agree that in a position like this Black 1 is the commonsense extension. If White 2, Black builds an excellent formation with 3. The efficiency of Black's three stones is in no way inferior to White's three. Instead of Black 3, Black 'a' and 'b' would also be excellent moves. Instead of 2 —

Dia. 7. If White switches to 2, Black is content to play the ordinary joseki of 3 and 5, as he can then occupy the large point of 7 on the top left. Black can be satisfied with this sequence.



Dia. 7: satisfied




Dia. 8: nothing to be dissatisfied with

Dia. 8. How about being more greedy by extending an extra space with 1? The wider move was dubious in *Dias. 4* and *5*, but there's nothing wrong with it in this case. Actually I believe that it is the spirit of greed that leads to progress.

There's no need to worry about the prospect of White's narrow extension to 'a' in answer to 1: just deal with it the same way as in *Dia. 6*. If White plays at 2, Black can play through the usual joseki, then occupy 7, the largest point at the top. This result is similar to *Dia. 7*: it's very hard to say which is superior. Personally I might take *Dia. 8*. Certainly Black has no reason to be dissatisfied with this result.

The only thing is that playing greedily may transform the game. That is —




Dia. 9: equal result at the top

Dia. 9. The wideness of the gap between Black 1 and the star-point stone makes it easy for White to make an approach move on the inside at 2. In this position, attaching at 3 is common sense: Black must not let White settle himself easily. The continuation to 7 is a standard one. I also consider this satisfactory for Black. Black hasn't established his superiority at the top, in contrast to *Dias. 7* and *8*, but then he has done better on the right.

If you dislike letting White play at 2, the only solution is to make the more conservative move of 1 at 'a'.

If you have digested all the above analysis, here is a difficult problem for you to challenge your wits with.




Dia. 10: Black to play


Dia. 10. White has just taken up position with the marked stone. Black wants to make an extension up the left side. The problem is to decide which is the best point: the answer is sure to be found among 'a' to 'd'. This is not an easy problem; I myself had a lot of trouble making up my mind. Each point will provoke a different response from White, so I would like you to hypothesize the continuations in each case.

Dia. 11. White's top-left corner enclosure is a little unusual, but even so Black 1 would normally be considered the 'commonsense' extension. The difficult thing about go is that common sense is not always valid. That's what makes go interesting. In this case, White will immediately invade at the 3-3 point, giving Black a slack result. Playing the joseki to 13 is about the best that Black can do, but now

Black 1 has been transformed into an inefficient stone. Nobody would extend to 1 if the sequence from 2 to 13 had been played first. Black 1 at 'a' would obviously be much more effective; either 'b' or 'c' would also be an improvement. That means that Black 1 scores badly.



Dia. 11: making the 3-3 invasion ideal




Dia. 12: second best


Dia. 12. Extending an extra space to 1 is an improvement. White will probably play at 2 now instead of invading at the 3-3. The right strategy for Black is to play 3 and 5. He can be satisfied with the result to 7. This is almost good enough to be called the correct answer.

Dia. 13. I decided to make the high extension to 1. I didn't want to see White invade at the 3-3 point, but my strategy seems to have been dubious. After White 2 to 6, I was on the

spot. Black's stone at 1 seems to be floating. There was no help for it but to play 7 and 9, then to attach at 11, a move Black hates to have to play, before defending at 13. You can't call this an improvement on *Dia. 12*.



Dia. 13: the actual game




Dia. 14: the correct answer

Dia. 14. Looking back on the position now, playing on the star-point at 1 seems to be best. If White invades at 'a', Black will be happy to block at 'b'. Most likely, White will extend to 2. Black views the 1-2 exchange as forcing and switches to the attack of 3. This might be best.


Dia. 15. I'd like you to look at another position from one of my games. How should Black respond to White's approach move of 2?

Dia. 16. Black 1 is the conventional answer, but it seems a little lacking in ingenuity. After the joseki to 4, Black can take the large point of 5, which is a fuseki move of the first rank, but White's extension to 6 is just as good a move.


The fuseki is now difficult to get in focus; if anything, it even seems more promising for White.




Dia. 15: Black to play



Dia. 16: not enough for Black




Dia. 17: feasible



Dia. 18: my strategy

Dia. 17. The pincer of 1 is quite feasible. Black's aim is to take the initiative on the right side while also going all out at the bottom. After the joseki to 7, a continuation such as White 8 and Black 9 is likely. This would give a reasonable game. However, I worked out a completely different strategy.

Dia. 18. My idea was to descend at 1. If White 2, Black keeps the game hectic by extending to 3. If instead of 2 White plays at 'a', Black extends to 'b'. The marked black stone is working all-out, so Black is not afraid of an invasion at the bottom. If White 4, Black plays 5 and gets a much more efficient result than in *Dia. 16*. He secures more corner territory on the bottom right and he gets a useful extension in place at 3. In the game, instead of 4 —



Dia. 19: White's counter

Dia. 19. White extended to 1. When he does this, Black is naturally tempted to expand the bottom area by attaching at 2. The continuation to 6 was as I had expected. I'm not saying that this result puts Black ahead, but don't you agree that it *feels* better than *Dia. 16* and 17?

This may have been a difficult example. I


would just like you to bear it in mind as a strategy for making the most efficient use of the stones one has already played, specifically, the marked stone. One way to become a better player is to seek to make the most of your previous moves.

(*Let's Go*, October 1988. Translated by John Power.)


The Myriad Techniques of Go: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. At first glance this capturing race looks hopeless for Black, as White has an eye and he has none. Black has to find a way to get around this problem. To begin with, Black 1 and 3 are essential. However, when White plays 4, the fight seems to be all over, as Black doesn't seem to have enough liberties. Black shouldn't give up, however.




Dia. 1: hopeless?




Dia. 2: suicide

Dia. 2. The tesuji is to commit suicide with Black 1: this is a very sharp move. After 2 —

Dia. 3. Black 1 is the wrong continuation: White has a clever answer at 2 that keeps his eye and wins the fight. Instead —



Dia. 3: wrong




Dia. 4: correct


Dia. 4. The throw-in at 1 is the follow-up tesuji. This secures a ko and is the only chance Black has of saving his group.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. First, let's try cutting at 1, as these white stones look a little weak. After 5 you may think that Black has won the fight, but if so your analysis is self-indulgent.



Dia. 1: Black wins?




Dia. 2: a ko

Dia. 2. White gets a ko with the standard tesuji of 1 and 3. This is a failure for Black.


Dia. 3. If White has been expecting *Dia. 2*, the placement of 1 will surely astonish him. After 2 and 3 —

Dia. 4. If White intercepts at 1, Black cuts at 2. White finds there is no way he can increase his liberties, so the result at the bottom is a seki, but only a temporary one, as the white stones above are now captured.


Dia. 5. White 1 is no improvement: Black 2 stops White from increasing his liberties, so he can never atari Black.




Dia. 3: a shock for White



Dia. 4: Black wins



Dia. 5: Black wins




Dia. 6: Black wins

Dia. 6. The only move left is pressing at 1, but when Black connects at 2 his bottom group has gained a liberty, so he now wins the capturing race with 4.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Obviously Black has to use his threat to link up with his stones to the right.

Black 1 is the only move, but 3 is wrong. After 6 Black can't link up: Black 'a' is refuted by White 'b'.




Dia. 1: failure




Dia. 2: the tesuji

Dia. 2. The tesuji here is Black 3. If White 4 or 'a' or 'b', Black links up with 5.

Dia. 3. Consequently, White will play 2 to stop Black from connecting, but Black then attacks White's liberties with 3. If White 4, Black attacks from the other side with 5 and 7 and wins the fight.



Dia. 3: Black wins




Dia. 4: Black wins


Dia. 4. Pulling back at 2 avoids the squeeze, but it doesn't help White. He still finds himself behind in the capturing race after 5.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. Black 1 is useless, as White gets a ladder with 2. Black has to find a way of cutting off the three white stones and defending against the ladder at the same time.




Dia. 1: too easy for White




Dia. 2: stopping the ladder

Dia. 2. Black 1 stops the ladder but lets White link up underneath with 2. If Black cuts at 3, White makes an eye with 4 to 8, then —

Dia. 3. If Black 1, White wins the fight with 2; if Black 'a', White 'b'.




Dia. 3: failure




Dia. 4: tesuji flash

Dia. 4. The move that achieves both of Black's aims is the sparkling tesuji of 1. If White 'a', Black 1 will block the ladder; if instead White 'b', Black cuts with 'c'.

Dia. 5. White can't link up, so he is forced to fight a capturing race with 2 and 4. However, Black has a good move at 7. Next —



Dia. 5: semeai




Dia. 6: Black wins


Dia. 6. Even if White tries to extend his liberties with 1 on, he ends up one move behind in the capturing race.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Extending at 3 after 1 looks best.




Dia. 1: a good start




Dia. 2: too impatient

Dia. 2. Next White takes away a liberty with 1. Black 2 in response is too impatient: Black finds after 6 that he has not increased his liberties.

Dia. 3. Correct is to extend along the edge one more time with 1. Black 5 is a good answer to 4. After 6, Black is able to link up to the outside with 7. Instead of 5 —




Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4: failure

Dia. 4. Extending at 1 leads to a reverse, as White can use a throw-in at 2 to catch Black.

Dia. 5. If White plays 2 and 4 (instead of 1 in *Dia. 2*), Black captures, then —



Dia. 5: variation




Dia. 6: Black wins


Dia. 6. Black calmly extends at 1. This also gives him a win by one move.

Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. This problem comes from the Chinese classic *Gengen Gokyo* (*The Mysterious Go Sutra*). The answer looks simple but is profound: the descent of 1. This move is a kind of probe to see what White does.




Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: wrong for White

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black 3 is a follow-up tesuji. If White 4, Black 5 saves all his stones and kills White — if White 'a', Black 'b'. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 3. If White intercepts at 2, Black uses the throw-in of 3 to reduce White's liberties. That enables him to pick up the tail end of the group and save his centre stones.



Dia. 3: Black lives




Dia. 4: also wrong

Dia. 4. If instead White answers 1 by blocking at 2, Black again uses the throw-in to capture three stones.


Continued on page 64.

Life and Death Problems


by Nakayama Noriyuki 6-dan




1. Black to kill White.




2. Black to kill White.




3. Black to kill White.



4. Black to live.



5. Black to live.



6. Black to kill White.


Answers on page 59.

Fuseki Problems


by Aragaki Takeshi 8-dan

Below are some fuseki problems, the first that we have given for quite some time. In most cases, the answers are not difficult: it's usually just a question


of picking the right simple move from the two or three obvious choices.




1. In answer to the marked white stone, should Black extend from the top or the bottom?




2. What is the right way for White to defend after making the marked exchange? Switching elsewhere is out of the question.




3. How should Black respond to the marked stone?



4. How should White play at the bottom?




5. This looks like a leisurely position, but there is a key strategic point that Black must not miss. His decision will have an important effect on the lead.



6. A high-level problem to finish with. White's right-side position looks thin: how should he reinforce it without falling behind in the fuseki?


Answers on page 60

Life and Death Problems: Answers




Answer to Problem 1

Black 1 is the vital point. If White tries to expand his eye space with 2 to 6, he finds himself unable to atari after Black makes one eye with 7.




Answer to Problem 2

If you can find Black 1, a *hanekomi*, the rest is simple. Once again White finds himself unable to atari because of shortage of liberties.




Answer to Problem 3

Black must play 3 to stop White from making two eyes. If then White 2, Black pushes in at 3, killing White.




Answer to Problem 4

Finding the contact play of 1 is the key. This makes an eye in sente. White 2 is forced, so Black lives with 3 and 5.



Answer to Problem 5

Black 1 may seem too slow, but it is the only way to live. If White 2, Black calmly completes his eye with 3. Next, 'a' and 'b' are *miai*.



Answer to Problem 6

Black sacrifices a stone with 1, leading White into shortage of liberties. There is no way he can make two eyes.

(Go Weekly, July, August 1991)


Fuseki Problems: Answers

Answer to Problem 1


Black 1 is the correct move. Black has just set up a moyo at the top with the two marked stones, so he wants to make the most of them. If he extended from the bottom right, White would make a two-space extension up the

right side, limiting the potential of the moyo.

If White answers 1 by extending to 'a', Black will probably invade at 'b'.



Answer to Problem 1




Answer to Problem 2


Answer to Problem 2

Players with a mechanical approach always make a two-space extension after the exchange in the bottom left corner, but the key to this problem is the location of the marked white stone. Since it is low, White makes balance by playing high with 1. White 1 also serves to counteract the influence of Black's left-side moyo.

Dia. 1. Black's invasion at 2 may look troublesome, but White should be prepared to fight with 3 and 5. Not being able to extend further than one space with 'a' is painful for Black. He may well find invading the right side at 'b' preferable to 2.



Dia. 1: ready to fight




Dia. 2: a different case

Dia. 2. In this position the ordinary move of 1 is correct. The reason is that if White plays 'a' and Black invades as before with 'b', he will have room to extend to 'c', getting a more comfortable position. The location of the marked stone is the key.


Answer to Problem 3

White 1 leaves no defects behind. It can be considered the joseki in this position. Black is most likely to switch to 2 next, in which case White should be prepared to attack with 3. It should be an even fight.


Dia. 1. A greedy move like 1 will lead to Black's undoing. Black can invade immediately at 2. If White resists with 3, Black has the clever combination of 4 and 6: White has no answer. Even if White plays 1 at 4, Black can still invade at 2.



Answer to Problem 3




Dia. 1: a fake move



Dia. 2: very bad


Dia. 2. Hurrying to take the large point of 1 is meaningless: the invasion of 1 gives him a very tough game. He loses far more at the bottom than he gains on the side.



Answer to Problem 4

Answer to Problem 4

The diagonal move of 1 is the standard attacking move in this kind of position. After making Black heavy with 2, White maintains the pressure with 3. If Black flees with 4, White reinforces his bottom position with 5 and still aims at continuing his attack. There is a rhythmic flow to White's moves.




Dia. 1: Black is satisfied

Dia. 1. What if Black invades at 2, ignoring White 1? White in turn should ignore Black: he can be quite satisfied to hane at 3. White takes profit in advance and can still aim at switching to the bottom left corner with 'a', so his single stone to the left is surprisingly light.


Dia. 2. White 1 lacks the strength to constitute an attack. If Black slides to 2, his group will be easy to settle. Once Black secures him-

self, White will have to worry about the weakness of his stones to the left.

Using 1 to defend at 'a' is no better. Black will be happy to slide to 2.



Dia. 2: not positive enough




Answer to Problem 5


Answer to Problem 5

I hope all my readers focussed on the top left corner. The correct answer is Black 1, a move that takes priority over all other points, no matter how big, on the board. It might seem slow, but the move it aims at next, Black 'a', is enormous.

Dia. 1. If White ignores 1, his base will be scooped out. Painful though it be, defending at 2 is unavoidable. This is a satisfying exchange for Black; having defended his corner in sente, he can switch to 3, confident he has the lead. Black could probably go as far as 'a' with 3 if he wanted to.



Dia. 1: a good forcing move



Dia. 2: wrong direction


Dia. 2. Black 1 might look good, but only to a superficial analysis. Attaching at 2 transforms the corner territory. If Black answers with 3 and 5, White can still peep at 6, and now it is Black whose base has been endangered.

Answer to Problem 6


In this position one wants to go all-out with 1. If you were concerned solely with defence, White 'a' would be solid, but it is very inefficient, making White overconcentrated. White 1 builds up the moyo while also applying some pressure to Black's corner above.

Dia. 1. Of course, White has to accept that he had bad *aji* in his side position. For example, Black can attack with the 1-2 combination. If so, White fights back with the ko to 8. White will welcome the fight if Black plunges


in immediately, so Black will play a waiting game. This *aji* will probably be one of the main concerns on both sides during the subsequent development of the game.



Answer to Problem 6



Dia. 1: aji for later



Dia. 2: missing the point completely


Dia. 2. Whatever happens, White shouldn't leave the right side just as it is. His shape will crumble when Black strikes at the vital point of 2. If he resists with 3, he suffers a major setback when Black cuts off a stone up to 10.

(Kido, October 1991)


The Myriad Shapes of Go

Continued from page 57.

Dia. 5. Connecting at 2 is the strongest answer. After 3 and 5, White then fights a ko with 6. This is the best sequence for both.



Dia. 5: correct



Dia. 6: a dud

Dia. 6. Making the throw-in immediately leads to failure. After 3, White connects at 1 and wins the fight. The point of this problem is to make use of the threat of the throw-in with the descent at 1 in *Dia. 1*.


(Igo Club, April 1991)

Life and Death Problems: Answers


Continued from page 48.

Answer to Problem 1

If Black 1, White must play 2. Black then uses the tesuji of 3 to force a ko. If White plays 4 at 5, Black kills him with 4. If Black plays 1 at 3, White lives with 1.



Answer to 1




Answer to 2

Answer to Problem 2

Black 1 forces White to capture at 2, so

Black next plays the decisive move of 3. He can now destroy White's eye shape with 5 and 7. After 8, Black recaptures below 8.



Answer to 3

Answer to Problem 3

Black hardly seems to have enough room to live, but the point is that he can play 1 in sente. If White doesn't connect at 2, Black cuts there and wins the capturing race. Black lives with 3. If Black cuts immediately with 1 at 2, he loses the capturing race after White 1.

(Go Weekly, 13 October 1992)

Go World News

Continued from page 48.

News from Korea

Lee Changho, now in first year of high school and still only 5-dan, has usurped his teacher's place as the number one title holder in Korea. Lee turned 17 on 29 July, and as of the end of June he held seven titles. His teacher Cho Hun-hyun has been reduced to five titles, and Seo 9-dan and Yoo 5-dan hold one each.

News from China

The 6th CCTV Cup, China's only *haya-go* tournament, was held at the newly opened Chinese Ki-in building from 2 to 5 May with 32 players participating. In the final, Ma Xiaochun defeated Nie Weiping to win this title for the second year in a row.

Late News

The fourth game of the Meijin title match, played on 14 and 15 October, was won by Otake.

Win the advantage in the corner!

THE GREAT JOSEKI DEBATES

Choosing Winning Corner Variations

by Honda Kuniyisa 9-dan

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